Board independence, corruption and innovation. Some evidence on UK subsidiaries by Sena, V et al.
 1 
BOARD	  INDEPENDENCE,	  CORRUPTION	  AND	  INNOVATION.	  SOME	  EVIDENCE	  






















University	  of	  Sheffield	  
mshaban@sheffield.ac.uk	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 2 
	  	  BOARD	  INDEPENDENCE,	  CORRUPTION	  AND	  INNOVATION.	  SOME	  EVIDENCE	  ON	  UK	  SUBSIDIARIES.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Abstract	  	  In	   this	   paper	   we	   test	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   independent	   boards	   can	   insulate	   a	  company	  from	  the	  detrimental	  impact	  of	  corruption	  on	  its	  performance	  (proxied	  by	   innovation).	   To	   this	   purpose,	   we	   have	   estimated	   an	   innovation	   production	  function	  that	  links	  innovation	  outputs	  to	  innovation	  input	  (namely	  investment	  in	  R&D)	   on	   a	   sample	   of	   manufacturing	   subsidiaries	   controlled	   by	   British	  multinationals	  and	  located	  in	  30	  countries.	  Our	  analysis	  covers	  the	  period	  2005-­‐2013.	   After	   controlling	   for	   the	   subsidiary’s	   characteristics	   (including	   the	  ownership	  structure	  and	  whether	  the	  main	  shareholders	  are	  from	  Common	  Law	  countries),	  we	  find	  that	  independent	  boards	  may	  mitigate	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  corruption	  on	  innovation	  as	  subsidiaries	  located	  in	  more	  corrupt	  countries	  and	  with	  more	   independent	  boards	   tend	   to	   invest	  more	   in	  R&D	  and	   register	  more	  valuable	  patents.	  These	  results	  still	  hold	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  average	  age	  of	  the	  directors,	  the	  proportion	  of	  directors	  with	  no	  local	  business	  affiliations	  and	  government	  effectiveness.	  	  	  Keywords:	  Board	  Independence,	  Corruption,	  Affiliates,	  Innovation.	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  1.	  INTRODUCTION	  	  The	  influence	  of	  the	  board	  structure	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  company	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  research	  areas	  in	  corporate	  finance	  (Dahya	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Aggarwal	  et	  al.,	  2009	  and	  Bruno	  and	  Claessens,	  2010;	  Black	  and	  Khanna,	  2007,	  Dahya	  and	  McConnell,	   2007).	   According	   to	   Fama	   and	   Jensen	   (1983),	   the	   board	   has	   two	  main	   functions:	   monitoring	   the	   senior	   management	   to	   protect	   the	   company	  against	   fraudulent	   behaviour	   and	   advising	   the	   management	   on	   the	   strategic	  direction	  taken	  by	  the	  company.	  The	  optimal	  board	  structure	  is	  then	  a	  function	  of	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   associated	   to	   the	   two	   functions,	   given	   the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  firm	  and	  its	  economic	  environment	  (Kim	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  	  	  Conventional	  wisdom	   suggests	   that	   boards	  with	   a	   large	   proportion	   of	   outside	  directors	  (i.e.	  more	   independent	  boards)	  may	  be	  effective	  monitors	  and	  have	  a	  positive	   impact	   on	   the	   company’s	   performance.	   Empirical	   research	   tends	   to	  support	   this	   view.	   Indeed,	   cross-­‐country	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   board	  independence	   is	   significantly	   and	   positively	   related	   to	   firms’	   performance	  (Dahya	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Aggarwal	  et	  al.,	  2009	  and	  Bruno	  and	  Claessens,	  2010)	  while	  single-­‐country	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   board	   is	  particularly	   relevant	   to	   companies	   that	   are	   located	   in	   countries	   with	   weak	  protection	   of	   the	   investors	   rights	   (Black	   and	   Khanna,	   2007,	   Dahya	   and	  McConnell,	   2007)	   consistently	   with	   the	   view	   that	   internal	   governance	  mechanisms	   (such	   as	   board	   structure	   in	   this	   case)	   are	   responses	   to	   firms’	  contracting	   and	   operating	   environments.	   Unsurprisingly	   then,	   it	   is	   commonly	  believed	   that	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   board	   is	   a	   key	   feature	   of	   a	   well-­‐run	  company	   (Liu	   et	   al.,	   2015)	   and	   several	   countries	   have	   adopted	   legislation	  demanding	  higher	  representation	  of	  outsiders	  on	  the	  boards	  of	  publicly	  traded	  companies1.	  	  	  	  Are	   the	  benefits	  of	   an	   independent	  board	   limited	  only	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  minority	   shareholders	   from	   the	   risk	   of	   expropriation?	   In	   this	   paper,	  we	   argue	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for US. In the UK, the corporate governance code requires firms to 
appoint to their boards a majority of independent directors. 
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there	   are	   additional	   benefits	   that	   may	   accrue	   to	   a	   company	   from	   having	   an	  independent	  board.	  More	   specifically,	  we	  suggest	   that	   independent	  boards	   can	  mitigate	   the	   impact	   of	   corruption	   on	   business	   performance.	   Corruption	   is	  usually	   the	   outcome	   of	   dysfunctional	   institutions	   and	   it	   can	   have	   a	   disruptive	  impact	  on	  a	  company:	   for	  example,	   corruption	   increases	   the	  costs	  of	  obtaining	  loans	  and	  licences	  (Fan	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Lemma,	  2014)	  and	  reduces	  the	  propensity	  to	  invest	  in	  innovation	  (Mahagaonkar,	  2008).	  Although	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption	  is	  well	  understood,	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  companies	  can	  use	  to	  mitigate	  the	  risk	  of	  corruption	  are	  less	  so.	  Some	  authors	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  in	  weak	  institutional	  environments	  the	  design	  of	  the	  internal	  governance	  mechanisms	  is	  critical	  for	  a	  company	   to	  mitigate	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   local	   institutions	   and	   perform	  well	   (La	  Porta	  et	  al,	  1998;	  Klapper	  and	  Love,	  2004).	  These	  typically	  include	  the	  board	  of	  directors	   and	   while	   the	   notion	   that	   boards	   can	   shelter	   companies	   from	  corruption	  is	  accepted,	  very	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  desirable	  board	  structure	  in	   corrupt	   countries.	   In	   this	  paper	  we	  suggest	   that	   independence	   from	   the	   top	  management	   is	   the	   key	   feature	   of	   boards	   that	   are	   effective	   in	   insulating	   a	  company	  from	  corruption.	  	  	  For	   our	   analysis,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   board	   of	   directors	   among	   multinational	  subsidiaries.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  group	  of	  firms	  to	  analyse	  for	  several	  reasons:	  first,	  multinationals	   tend	   to	  be	  very	   sensitive	   to	   the	   levels	  of	   corruption	   in	   the	  host	  country.	  Indeed,	  corruption	  tends	  to	  increase	  the	  costs	  of	  operating	  abroad	  while	   decreasing	   the	   return	   on	   foreign	   investment	   (Wei,	   2000;	   De	   Rosa	   et	   al.,	  2010).	  Ultimately,	  multinationals	  prefer	  not	  to	  invest	  in	  countries	  characterised	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  if	  they	  do	  so,	  they	  prefer	  partnerships	  to	  equity	  modes.	   Second,	   because	   of	   the	   strategic	   nature	   of	   FDI,	   multinationals	   use	   a	  variety	   of	   corporate	   governance	   mechanisms	   to	   control	   their	   investment	   and	  ensure	   that	   they	   are	   not	   expropriated	   either	   by	   local	   managers	   or	   by	   other	  shareholders.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   expected	   that	   boards	  may	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   governance	   that	   multinationals	   adopt	   when	   investing	   abroad	  although	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  on	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  desirable	  board	  structure	  in	  these	  cases.	  Finally,	  recent	  high-­‐profile	  cases	  of	  corruption	  among	  multinational	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subsidiaries2	  have	  put	  the	  board	  structure	  under	  the	  limelight	  and	  therefore	  an	  analysis	   of	  whether	   the	   board	   structure	   is	   an	   effective	  mechanism	   to	   insulate	  affiliates’	  performance	  from	  corruption	  is	  rather	  timely.	  	  Against	  this	  background,	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  explore	  whether	  in	  more	   corrupt	   countries	   subsidiaries	   with	   more	   independent	   boards	   perform	  better	  than	  subsidiaries	  with	  less	  independent	  boards	  after	  controlling	  for	  a	  set	  of	  characteristics	  of	  the	  subsidiary	  and	  of	  the	  board	  itself.	  In	  a	  set	  of	  robustness	  tests,	   we	   explore	   whether	   it	   is	   really	   independence	   that	   matters	   for	   a	   well	  performing	   company	   in	   a	   corrupt	   country	   or	   rather	   there	   are	   other	  characteristics	   of	   the	   board	   that	   are	   equally	   important.	   We	   therefore	   test	  whether	  the	  relationship	  between	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  and	  R&D	  intensity	  still	  holds	  after	  controlling	  for	  other	  characteristics	  of	  the	  directors.	  In	  particular	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  directors’	  average	  age	  (as	  a	  proxy	  for	  their	  experience)	  and	  on	  the	   connections	   they	   have	   with	   foreign	   companies.	   This	   way	   we	   eventually	  provide	   some	   useful	   empirical	   evidence	   on	   the	   desirable	   structure	   of	   the	  directors’	  boards	  among	  affiliates	  in	  corrupt	  countries.	  	  Unlike	  previous	  papers	   in	  this	  area,	  we	  focus	  on	   innovation	  as	  our	   indicator	  of	  business	  performance	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  company’s	  financial	  performance	  or	  its	  market	  value.	  This	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  novelty	  of	  the	  paper.	  Although	  a	  few	  papers	  have	  analysed	   the	   relationship	   between	   independence	   of	   the	   board	   and	   firm	  performance,	  hardly	  any	  has	  focused	  on	  innovation	  as	  a	  business	  outcome.	  Still	  innovation	  underpins	  business	  growth	  and	  eventually	  financial	  performance	  as	  innovative	   firms	   tend	   to	   be	   more	   productive	   and	   profitable.	   Eventually,	   they	  perform	   better	   on	   the	   financial	   markets	   and	   can	   attract	   external	   funding.	   In	  addition,	   the	   relationship	   among	   innovation	   and	   corruption	   is	   relatively	  underexplored.	   Whether	   innovation	   is	   negatively	   associated	   to	   the	   level	   of	  corruption	  in	  a	  country	  is	  unclear.	  It	  is	  commonly	  argued	  that	  innovation	  can	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The bribery scandals that have involved Walmart in Mexico and Avon in China have highlighted the 
weaknesses of their governance. Also, empirical evidence suggests that affiliates in foreign countries 
are as likely as their domestic counterparts to engage in corruption (Hellman et al., 2002). The 
Transparency International Bribe Payer Index shows that companies from leading exporting countries 
are the most likely to pay bribes in foreign countries. Georgeiev et al. (2011) show that affiliates tend 
propensity to pay bribes in sectors that offer higher rents. 
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stifled	   in	   corrupt	   countries	   as	   bribes	   can	   subtract	   resources	   that	   could	   be	  otherwise	   used	   by	   companies	   to	   invest	   in	   R&D3.	   The	   main	   argument	   is	   that	  innovation	  is	  a	  complex	  process	  with	  uncertain	  output	  (i.e.	  the	  actual	  invention)	  and	  corrupt	  managers	  can	  exploit	   this	  uncertainty	  to	  divert	  resources	   for	  their	  private	  benefit	  and	  allow	  R&D	  projects	   to	   fail	  while	  blaming	  the	  uncertainty	  of	  the	   process	   for	   the	   failure.	   However,	   it	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   that	   bribes	   can	  reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   bureaucratic	   expropriation	   with	   the	   result	   that	   companies	  may	  be	  more	  willing	   to	   invest	   in	  R&D	  projects	  with	  more	  uncertain	  outcomes.	  Interestingly,	   Schleifer	   and	   Vishny	   (1993)	   find	   that	   corrupt	   firms	  would	   often	  report	  having	  advanced	  technologies	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  necessary.	  	  	  	  To	  model	  the	  relationship	  among	  corruption,	  propensity	  to	  innovate	  (or	  number	  of	   innovations)	  and	   internal	  corporate	  governance	  mechanisms	  (i.e.	  ownership	  concentration	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  board),	  we	  estimate	  an	  innovation	  production	  function	  that	  links	  innovation	  outputs	  to	  innovation	  input	  (namely	  investment	  in	  R&D).	   We	   use	   two	   measures	   of	   innovation	   outputs:	   the	   number	   of	   patents	  registered	  with	  the	  European	  Patent	  Office	  (EPO)	  by	  the	  affiliate	  in	  a	  given	  year	  and	   the	   cumulated	   sum	   of	   forward	   citations	   that	   the	   patents	   have	   received.	  Patents	   are	   a	   common	   indicator	   of	   business	   innovation.	   However,	   not	   all	   the	  patents	   have	   the	   same	   value	   as	   some	   innovations	  may	   be	  more	   valuable	   than	  others.	   For	   these	   reasons,	   we	   use	   the	   number	   of	   forward	   citations	   (i.e.,	   the	  citations	  received	  by	  the	  patents	  registered	  by	  a	  firms	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  registered	  patents)	   as	   an	   indicator	  of	   the	  patents’	   quality.	  Earlier	   studies	  have	  shown	  that	  forward	  citations	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  monetary	  value	  of	   the	   patent	   (Harhoff	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   Lanjouw	   and	   Schankerman,	   2001;	  Trajtenberg,	  1990),	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that	  that	  forward	  citations	  are	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  the	  value	  of	  a	  patent.	  	  	  	  Our	  innovation	  input	  is	  the	  investment	  in	  R&D	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  affiliates	  in	  our	  sample.	   However,	   the	   innovation	   literature	   has	   established	   that	   not	   all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Mahagoankar (2008) provides some evidence showing that corruption can affect negatively product 
innovation. 
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companies	   invest	   in	   R&D	   and	   that	   R&D-­‐performing	   firms	   are	   a	   self-­‐selected	  group.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  exists	  a	  problem	  of	  self-­‐selection	  in	  the	  sample	  that	  needs	   to	  be	  addressed	  when	  estimating	   the	   innovation	  production	   function.	   In	  addition,	  we	  also	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  investment	  in	  R&D	  is	  lumpy	  and	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  lag	  between	  the	  year	  the	  investment	  in	  R&D	  takes	  place	  and	  the	  year	  a	  patent	  is	  registered.	  In	  other	  words	  in	  our	  sample	  there	  may	  be	  firms	  which	  may	   register	   a	  patent	  but	  may	  have	  not	  performed	  R&D	  over	   the	   years	  covered	  by	  our	  sample.	  To	  be	  able	   to	  address	   these	   two	   issues,	  we	   first	  model	  the	   affiliate-­‐level	   investment	   in	   R&D	   where	   the	   self-­‐selection	   into	   R&D	  investment	   is	  explicitly	  modelled;	   this	   is	   then	   followed	  by	   the	  estimation	  of	  an	  innovation	   production	   function	  where	   the	   predicted	  R&D	   intensity	   (calculated	  from	  the	  first	  set	  of	  equations)	  appears	  as	  the	  innovation	  input.	  	  We	  assume	  that	  the	  affiliates’	  characteristics	  influence	  the	  self-­‐selection	  into	  the	  R&D	  investment	  while	  the	  R&D	  intensity	  is	  driven	  by	  level	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  host	  country,	  the	  structure	   of	   the	   board	   (namely,	   its	   size	   and	   independence)	   and	   the	   level	   of	  foreign	  ownership	  (proxied	  by	  a	  dummy	  variable).	  In	  our	  main	  specification,	  we	  interact	   the	   indicator	   of	   board	   independence	   with	   the	   level	   of	   corruption	   to	  gauge	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   in	   more	   corrupt	   countries,	   subsidiaries	   with	   more	  independent	   boards	   tend	   to	   invest	   more	   in	   R&D.	   The	   literature	   on	   the	   board	  structure	   and	   on	   the	   drivers	   of	   its	   independence,	   in	   particular,	   suggests	   that	  R&D	   intensity	   (taken	   as	   a	   proxy	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   a	   company’s	   operations)	  may	  actually	  drive	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  board	  with	  the	  result	  that	  the	  indicator	  of	  board	   independence	   cannot	   be	   considered	   exogenous	   to	   the	   affiliates’	   R&D	  intensity.	  We	   therefore	  use	  an	   instrumental	  variable	   (IV)	  estimator	   (while	   still	  controlling	   for	   the	   potential	   sample	   selection)	   to	   estimate	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   affiliates’	   R&D	   intensity,	   board	   independence	   and	   perceived	  corruption	  in	  the	  host	  country;	  the	  board	  independence	  (and	  its	  interaction	  with	  the	   level	  of	  corruption	   in	  the	  host	  country)	   is	   instrumented	  by	  three	  variables:	  the	   proportion	   of	   foreign	   executives	   in	   the	   host	   country	   working	   in	   other	  multinationals	   belonging	   to	   the	   same	   industrial	   sector	   of	   the	   affiliate	   under	  observation,	   the	   number	   of	   multinationals	   operating	   in	   the	   region	   and	   the	  country	  the	  affiliate	  is	  located	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  female	  directors	  below	  fifty	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years	   old	  working	   in	   other	  multinationals	   that	   operate	   in	   the	   same	   industrial	  sector	  the	  affiliate	  belongs	  to.	  	  	  	  	  	  Our	  empirical	   analysis	  has	  been	   conducted	  on	  a	  data-­‐set	  of	  4,100	  UK	  affiliates	  from	   the	  manufacturing	   sector,	   located	   in	   30	   countries	   and	   observed	   over	   the	  period	   2005-­‐2013.	   For	   each	   of	   these	   affiliates,	  we	   have	   information	   about	   the	  patents	   they	   have	   registered	  with	   the	   European	   Patent	   Office	   as	  well	   as	   their	  forward	  citations.	  We	  also	  have	  information	  about	  the	  ownership	  structure	  (i.e.	  the	   proportion	   of	   shares	   owned	   by	   the	   parent	   company	   as	   well	   as	   by	   the	  remaining	  shareholders)	  and	   the	  characteristics	  of	   their	  directors.	   	  The	  results	  show	  that	   independent	  boards	  may	  mitigate	   the	  negative	   impact	  of	   corruption	  on	   innovation:	   subsidiaries	   located	   in	   more	   corrupt	   countries	   with	   more	  independent	   boards	   tend	   to	   invest	   more	   in	   R&D.	   In	   turn	   they	   register	   more	  patents	  and	   their	  portfolio	  of	  patents	   tends	   to	  be	  valuable.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  R&D	  investment	  in	  these	  subsidiaries	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  productive	  than	  what	  we	  observe	  among	  affiliates	  located	  in	  the	  same	  country	  but	  with	  less	  independent	  boards.	   Our	   results	   suggest	   that	   multinationals	   are	   aware	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  independent	  boards	  may	  not	  be	  effective	  advisors	  with	  the	  result	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  draw	  the	   independent	  directors	   from	  the	  pool	  of	   (either	   female	  or	  young	  or	  foreign)	  executives	  in	  the	  same	  industry.	  However,	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	   corruption,	   this	   strategy	   is	   not	   very	   successful	   as	   the	   benefits	   of	   having	   a	  largely	  independent	  board	  are	  smaller	  than	  the	  costs	  associated	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  outside	  directors.	  These	  results	  also	  hold	  after	  controlling	  for	  the	  average	  age	  of	   the	   directors,	   the	   proportion	   of	   directors	  with	   no	   local	   business	   affiliations	  and	  government	  effectiveness.	  	  	  This	   paper	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   in	   this	   area	   in	   several	   ways.	  First,	   it	   shows	   that	   boards	   in	   well-­‐performing	   companies	   located	   in	   corrupt	  countries	  have	  to	  be	  independent	  from	  the	  local	  management.	   Importantly,	   the	  paper	  shows	  that	  other	  ways	  of	  structuring	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  (by	  appointing	  more	  experienced	  directors	  or	  directors	  with	  no	  local	  connections)	  may	  not	  be	  as	  effective	  as	  independence	  in	  insulating	  affiliates	  from	  corruption.	  Second,	  it	  is	  the	   first	  paper	   that	   tries	   to	  assess	   the	  relevance	   to	  affiliates	  of	  an	   independent	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board	  together	  with	  the	  benefits	  that	  may	  accrue	  to	  them.	  Third,	  it	  contributes	  to	  the	   literature	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   operating	   environment	   in	   conditioning	   the	  structure	  of	  the	  board	  in	  companies	  with	  complex	  and	  technical	  operations	  (like	  R&D	  performing	  firms).	  While	  theory	  (Raheja,	  2005;	  Adams	  and	  Ferreira,	  2007)	  suggests	   that	   business	   performance	   increases	   in	   the	   insiders’	   fraction	   among	  R&D	   intensive	   firms	   as	   sharing	   information	   with	   outside	   directors	   can	   be	  expensive,	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  contradictory4.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  business	  and	  institutional	  environment	  (here	  proxied	  by	  the	  levels	  of	  corruption	  in	  the	  host	  country)	  may	  drive	  the	  preference	  of	  R&D	  performing	  firms	  for	  different	  ways	  of	  structuring	  the	  board.	  	  	  The	  structure	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  as	  follows.	  Section	  2	  offers	  a	  brief	  summary	  on	  the	  main	   themes	  and	   results	   from	   the	   literature	  on	  multinationals,	   corruption	  and	  internal	  mechanisms	  of	  corporate	  governance.	  Section	  3	  presents	  the	  empirical	  specification	  of	   the	   innovation	  production	   function	   as	  well	   as	   the	  data-­‐set	   and	  the	   variables.	   The	   results	   are	   illustrated	   in	   Section	   4	   while	   some	   concluding	  remarks	  are	  offered	  in	  Section	  5.	  	  	  	  
2.	  CORRUPTION,	  MULTINATIONALS	  AND	  BOARD	  INDEPENDENCE	  	  Understanding	   the	   impact	   of	   corruption	   on	   economic	   growth	   and	   other	  economic	  outcomes	  has	  always	  been	  a	  key	  research	  area	   in	  several	  disciplines	  for	   decades	   now	   (see	   Aidt,	   2009	   for	   a	   useful	   survey).	   Corruption	   is	   a	  multifaceted	  phenomenon	  (Hellman	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  which	  may	  include	  the	  bribing	  of	   public	   officials,	   kickbacks	   in	   public	   procurement	   and	   misappropriation	   of	  public	   funds.	   Definitions	   of	   corruption	   vary	   a	   lot5	  but	   there	   is	   agreement	   that	  what	   really	   defines	   corruption	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   public	   power	   is	   misused	   for	  private	   benefit	   in	   an	   illegal	   fashion	   (Mauro,	   1998;	   Treisman,	   2000;	   Reiter	   and	  Steensma,	   2010).	   A	   feature	   that	   links	   all	   the	   corrupt	   practices	   is	   that	   they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Boone et al. (2007). For example Linck et al. (2008) find that 
R&D intensity and board independence are positively related while Coles et al. (2008) find that R&D 
performing firms have a preference for inside directors.   
5 Friedman et al. (2000) emphasises the costs to businesses and to the society in general of corruption 
while Nye (1989) stresses the misuse of power for private benefits.  
 10 
generate	  rents	  that	  can	  be	  either	  shared	  between	  firms	  and	  corrupt	  officials	  or	  entirely	  appropriated	  by	  corrupt	  bureaucrats6.	  As	  for	  the	  origins	  of	  corruption,	  there	   is	   consensus	   that	   corruption	   tends	   to	   be	   an	   expression	   of	   dysfunctional	  legal	  institutions	  and	  poor	  public	  governance	  quality	  leading,	  in	  turn,	  to	  opaque	  work	  practices	  within	  government	  departments	  (see	  Hellman	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  Corruption	   is	  believed	   to	  be	  detrimental	   to	  a	  country’s	  economic	  outcomes	   for	  several	   reasons:	   it	  has	  a	  negative	   impact	  on	   the	  adoption	  of	  new	   technologies,	  slows	   down	   the	   process	   of	   capital	   accumulation	   and	   (last	   but	   not	   the	   least)	  harms	  the	  country’s	  capability	  to	  attract	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  (FDI)	  (Krusell	  and	   Rios-­‐Rull,	   1996;	   Acemoglu	   and	   Verdier,	   1998;	   Aidt	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   This	   last	  point	   is	   hardly	   surprising:	   high	   levels	   of	   corruption	   are	   usually	   associated	   to	  institutional	   environments	   with	   poor	   governance	   and	   weak	   protection	   of	  property	   rights,	   factors	   that	   are	   usually	   perceived	   unfavourably	   by	   foreign	  investors	  (Egger	  and	  Winner,	  2005).	  As	  corruption	  weakens	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  country-­‐wide	  institutions	  in	  protecting	  the	  interests	  of	  foreign	  investors	  and	  may	   expose	   them	   to	   the	   risk	   of	   expropriation,	   it	  may	   increase	   the	   operational	  cost	   of	   investing	   abroad7	  (see	   for	   instance	  Hines,	   1995,	  Wei,	   2000,	  Asiedu	   and	  Freeman	  (2009),	  Batra	  et	  al.	   (2003),	  Gaviria	  (2002)8),	  reduce	  the	  return	  to	   the	  foreign	   investment	   (Bhaumik	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   and	   eventually	   harm	   their	  performance	  (De	  Rosa	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  press	  and	  the	  academic	  literature	  offer	  plenty	  of	   examples	  of	  how	  corrupt	  practices	   in	  host	   countries	   can	  damage	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 According to Hellman et al. (2001), this is the key difference between the two main types of 
corruption, namely state capture (where firms can affect the formulation of the laws and regulation 
through private payments to public officials and politicians) and administrative corruption ("petty" 
forms of bribery in connection with the implementation of laws, rules and regulations).  
7 Wei (2000) suggests that bribes can be considered additional taxes that increase the uncertainty of 
returns to foreign investment. 8	  Multinationals	  may	  be	  banned	  from	  operating	  in	  foreign	  countries:	  in	  1996,	  five	  multinationals	  were	  banned	  by	  Singapore	   from	  bidding	  on	  any	  government	  projects	  as	   their	  agent	  was	   found	  guilty	  of	  paying	  bribes.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  survey-­‐based	  study	  that	  involved	  firms	  drawn	  from	  20	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America,	  Gaviria	  (2002)	  assesses	  the	  effect	  of	  corruption	  on	  firm	  performance	  and	   concludes	   that	   corruption	   substantially	   reduces	   sales	   growth,	   lowers	   investment	   and	  employment	  growth.	  In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  using	  firm-­‐level	  data	  from	  46	  countries,	  Lee	  and	  Ng	  (2006)	  demonstrate	   that	   firms	   from	  more	   corrupt	   countries	   trade	   at	   significantly	   lower	   stock	   values	  than	   is	   the	  case	   for	   firms	   from	  less	  corrupt	  countries	  and	  also	   that	  corruption	  has	  a	  significant	  economic	  consequences	  for	  shareholder	  value.	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parent	  company9.	  Although	  these	  practices	  have	  been	  justified	  by	  the	  suggestion	  that	   they	   facilitate	   the	   operations	   of	   a	   company	   in	   a	   foreign	   country10,	   survey	  data	   effectively	   dismantle	   this	   notion	   by	   showing	   the	   full	   disruptive	   effect	   of	  corruption	   on	   businesses	   (either	   foreign	   or	   domestic) 11 .	   Unsurprisingly,	  empirical	   research	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   level	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	  host	   country	   and	   foreign	   direct	   investment	   finds	   that	   foreign	   investors	   prefer	  not	  to	  invest	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  levels	  of	  corruption	  and	  rent-­‐seeking	  are	  too	  high	   and	   if	   they	   do	   so	  multinationals	  may	   prefer	   partnerships	   and	   non	   equity	  modes12	  to	   a	   fully	   controlled	   subsidiary	   so	   that	   they	   could	   still	   benefit	   from	  having	   access	   to	   foreign	   markets	   but	   without	   bearing	   the	   hidden	   costs	  associated	  to	  operating	  in	  a	  corrupt	  environment	  (see	  Straub,	  2008;	  Javorcic	  and	  Wei,	  2009;	  Demirbag	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  	  Still,	   multinationals	   do	   invest	   in	   corrupt	   countries	   and	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   equity	  modes13.	   One	   reason	   for	   this	   preference	   for	   equity	  modes	   (even	   if	   it	   involves	  investing	  in	  corrupt	  countries)	  is	  that	  for	  most	  multinationals,	  partnerships	  and	  greenfield/brownfield	   investments	   are	  not	  perfect	   substitutes	   as	   the	   literature	  tends	  to	  assume	  (Tekin-­‐Koru,	  2013).	  While	  partnerships	  provide	  rapid	  access	  to	  a	   foreign	  market	   and	   allow	   to	   exploit	   quickly	   existing	   synergies	  between	   local	  firms	   and	   affiliates,	   greenfields	   allow	   a	   multinational	   to	   fully	   appropriate	   the	  benefits	  from	  the	  investment	  abroad.	  This	  point	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  R&D	  performing	  firms	  or	  to	  technological	  firms	  which	  may	  want	  to	  protect	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for instance the impact that the Walmart bribery scandal in Mexico has had on the parent 
company (refer to Heineman, 2014 for further details). Pantzalis et al. (2008) find that the valuation of 
multinationals is negatively affected by the expansion into corrupt countries.  
10This is the so-called “Grease the wheel” hypothesis. First suggested by Leff (1964), this hypothesis 
suggests that corruption facilitates trade and promotes efficiency by allowing companies to circumvent 
cumbersome regulations. In reality, Kaufman and Wei (1999) find that firms that pay more bribes face 
more red tape.  11	  An	  old	  survey	  of	  3600	  firms	  in	  69	  countries	  conducted	  for	  the	  1997	  World	  development	  report	  highlight	  how	  paying	  bribes	  in	  exchange	  for	  favour	  or	  basic	  public	  services	  is	  a	  way	  of	  conducting	  business	  in	  some	  countries.	  However,	  the	  interviewed	  also	  pointed	  out	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  the	  promised	  service	  or	   favour	  will	  be	  delivered	  and	   the	  real	   consequence	  of	  paying	  a	  bribe	   is	  that	  it	  paves	  the	  way	  to	  additional	  requests	  (World	  Development	  Report,	  1997).	  	  	  	  
12 Non equity modes refer to exports and contractual agreements such as licensing, franchising and 
R&D contracts (Peng, 2009). Equity modes include joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries. The 
first consists of a sharing agreement between an MNE and a local firm. In the second case, they include 
both Greenfield investments involving the establishment of a new firm and the acquisition of existing 
firms.  
13 See for instance the investments of Ford, General Motors and Mars in Russia. In all the three cases, 
the parent company has decided to invest in Russia via either a brownfield or a greenfield.  
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intellectual	  capital	  and	  fully	  appropriate	  the	  return	  of	  the	  investment	  in	  R&D14.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  what	  internal	  strategies	  are	  available	  to	  multinationals	  that	  want	  to	   invest	   in	   a	   foreign	   country	   via	   an	   equity	   mode	   but	   want	   to	   insulate	   the	  performance	  of	  their	  subsidiaries	  from	  corruption?	  	  	  A	   few	   papers	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   design	   of	   the	   internal	   corporate	  governance	  mechanisms	  among	  subsidiaries	  is	  the	  main	  channel	  through	  which	  foreign	   owners	   manage	   to	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   expropriated	   by	   corrupt	  managers	   and	   bureaucrats	   (see	   Mani	   et	   al.,	   2007	   for	   instance).	   This	   is	  unsurprising:	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  weak	  legal	  institutions	  require	  companies	  to	  have	   in	   place	   a	   strong	   internal	   governance	   structure	   to	   mitigate	   the	   adverse	  effects	  of	   the	  poor	   institutional	  quality15.	  The	  starting	  point	  of	   this	   literature	   is	  that	   the	   managerial	   discretion	   which	   is	   inherent	   to	   the	   manager’s	   position,	  combined	  with	   the	  existence	  of	   the	  manager’s	  own	   interest	  and	  the	  separation	  between	   ownership	   and	   control,	   can	   provide	   a	   gateway	   for	   corruption	   into	   a	  company.	  For	  instance,	  a	  manager	  may	  agree	  to	  pay	  a	  bribe	  so	  that	  the	  company	  may	   obtain	   a	   contract	   with	   the	   result	   that	   the	   manager’s	   remuneration	   can	  increase.	  The	  corporate	  governance	  literature	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  implications	   of	   this	   split	   for	   the	   owners	   and	   several	   mechanisms	   have	   been	  suggested	   to	   re-­‐align	   the	   interests	   of	   managers	   to	   those	   of	   the	   owners	   (or	  shareholders).	   The	  main	   implication	   is	   that	   as	   long	   as	   corruption	   is	   linked	   to	  managerial	  discretion,	  the	  same	  internal	  governance	  mechanisms	  that	  can	  limit	  or	   control	  managerial	  discretion	  may	  also	   insulate	  companies	   from	  the	  hidden	  costs	  of	  operating	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption.	  	  	  There	   are	   two	   main	   internal	   corporate	   governance	   mechanisms	   that	   are	  typically	  used	  for	  this	  purpose:	  1)	  ownership	  concentration	  and	  2)	  the	  structure	  of	   the	   board	   of	   directors.	   A	   lot	   is	   known	   about	   the	   ownership	   patterns	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Javorcik and Wei (2009) find that technological advanced multinationals may prefer fully owned 
subsidiaries to avoid leakages of know-how. Equally, Marin (2005) finds that R&D intensive 
subsidiaries tend to be fully owned by multinationals. 
15 La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that in countries with weak investor protection rights, stockholders 
may have to rely on other means of protection. Klapper and Love (2004) find that in countries with 
weak legal governance, firm-level corporate governance mechanisms can compensate for ineffective 
enforcement by establishing good corporate governance and credible investor protection. 
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companies	  located	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  corruption16.	  For	  instance,	  Du	  (2008)	   finds	   that	   corruption	   leads	   to	   a	   higher	   degree	   of	   corporate	   ownership	  concentration	   while	   Lemma	   (2010)	   finds	   that	   in	   more	   corrupt	   countries	  concentrated	   ownership	   and	   block	   shareholding	   are	   the	   preferred	   ownership	  structures.	   Equally	   a	   lot	   is	   also	   known	   about	   the	   ownership	   structure	   among	  multinationals’	  subsidiaries	  in	  corrupt	  countries	  (see	  Brouthers,	  2002;	  Gatignon	  and	   Anderson,	   1988;	  Mani	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Meyer	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	   preference	   of	  multinationals	  for	  concentrated	  ownership	  when	  investing	  in	  corrupt	  countries	  is	  well	  documented	   (Mani	  et	  al.	  2007).	  First,	   since	   foreign	  direct	   investment	   is	  characterised	  by	  strategic	  interests,	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  commitment	  and	  ex	  post	  immobility	  (Aguilera	  and	  Jackson,	  2003),	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  ownership	  structure	  becomes	   critical	   (Carr	   et	   al.,	   2001).	   Second,	   in	   corrupt	   countries	   with	   severe	  corruption,	   the	   enforcement	   institutions	   are	   weak	   and	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  minority	   shareholders	  are	   less	   likely	   to	  be	  protected	   from	  expropriation	  while	  only	   large	   shareholders	   may	   have	   the	   incentives	   to	   monitor	   the	   local	  management17.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  while	  the	  concentration	  of	  ownership	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  main	  agency	  problem,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  this	  mechanism	  alone	  may	  protect	   the	   subsidiary	   from	   the	   negative	   impact	   of	   corruption	   on	   its	  performance.	  A	  large	  literature	  has	  now	  highlighted	  the	  dangers	  of	  concentrated	  ownership	   to	   the	   performance	   of	   a	   company:	   in	   a	   seminal	   paper,	   Shleifer	   and	  Vishny	  (1997)	  argue	  that	  firms	  with	  concentrated	  ownership	  tend	  to	  be	  opaque	  organisations	  and	  that	  the	  dominant	  shareholders	  may	  still	  damage	  a	  company’s	  performance	   by	   underinvesting	   so	   to	   extract	   private	   benefits	   as	   majority	  shareholders	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   face	   scrutiny	   from	  other	   shareholders	   (see	   also	  Bhaumik,	   Driffield	   and	   Pal,	   2010	   on	   this	   point).	   The	   costs	   associated	   to	  concentrated	  ownership	  may	  be	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  companies	  operating	  in	  corrupt	  environments	  as	  majority	  owners	  may	  now	  be	   inclined	  to	  engage	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 In a seminal paper, La Porta et. (1999) find that concentrated ownership and legal protection of 
investors’ rights are substitute corporate governance.  17	  See	  Young	  et	  al.	  (2008).	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corruption	   (similarly	   to	   what	   managers	   would	   do)	   and	   shift	   the	   cost	   of	  corruption	  onto	  minority	  shareholders.	  	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  the	  board	  structure	  has	  been	  identified	  as	  an	  additional	  internal	  governance	  mechanism	  that	  multinationals	  can	  use	  to	  insulate	  affiliates	  from	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption.	  Fama	  and	  Jensen	  (1983)	  pointed	  out	  that	  as	  the	  ultimate	  legal	  authority	  in	  a	  company,	  the	  board	  has	  two	  main	  functions:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  has	  to	  scrutinize	  the	  top	  management	  and	  veto	  projects	  that	  are	  not	  value-­‐maximizing	  (monitoring	  function)	  while	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  has	  to	  draw	  on	   its	   expertise	   to	   support	   the	   senior	   management	   and	   give	   advice	   on	   the	  strategic	   direction	   of	   the	   company	   (advising	   function)	   (see	   Banes	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Linck	   et	   al.,	   2008	   and	   Coles	   et	   al.,	   2008	   as	   well).	   When	   performing	   either	  function,	  the	  board	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  defence	  against	  the	  emergence	  of	  corrupt	  practices	  within	  the	  company:	  as	  a	  monitor,	  it	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  identify	  and	  veto	  projects	   that	   can	   only	   be	   vehicles	   for	   illicit	   payments	  while	   as	   an	   advisor,	   the	  board	  can	  help	  the	  management	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  local	  institutions	  and	  norms	   as	  well	   as	   their	   pitfalls.	   It	   is	   usually	   assumed	   that	   boards	  with	   a	   large	  fraction	   of	   independent	   directors	   are	   effective	   monitors	   as	   they	   are	   less	  susceptible	   to	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	   senior	   managers.	   In	   addition,	   outside	  directors	   may	   bring	   useful	   knowledge	   that	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   to	   foreign	  companies.	  All	  this	  supports	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  independent	  boards	  may	  be	  preferable	  when	   investing	  abroad.	   Indeed,	   empirical	   research	   suggests	  that	  independent	  boards	  are	  desirable	  in	  countries	  with	  poor	  legal	   institutions.	  	  Independence	   of	   the	   boards	   is	   a	   key	   feature	   of	   a	   well-­‐managed	   company	   in	  countries	  where	  the	  minority	  shareholders’	  rights	  are	  not	  adequately	  protected	  by	  the	  local	  legal	  system	  (See	  Dahya	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Aggrawal	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Claessens	  et	   al.	   (2006)	   and	   Bruno	   and	   Claessens	   (2010)	   have	   found	   that	   the	   degree	   of	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  the	  good	  performance	  of	  a	  company.	  This	  result	  has	  also	  been	  confirmed	  by	  studies	  that	  have	  focused	  on	  individual	  countries	  like	  India,	  U.K.	  and	  Korea	  (Black	  and	  Khanna,	  2007;	  Dahya	  and	   McConnell,	   2007;	   Bruno	   and	   Claessens,	   2010;	   Black	   and	   Kim,	   2012)18.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Yeh	  and	  Woidtke	  (2005)	  examine	  determinants	  of	  board	  composition	  and	  firm	  valuation	  as	  a	  function	   of	   board	   composition	   in	   Taiwan.	   They	   find	   that	   when	   the	   board	   is	   dominated	   by	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Finally,	   in	   a	   robustness	   test	   Kim	   et	   al.	   (2007)	   find	   that	   in	   countries	  with	   less	  corruption,	  companies	   tend	   to	  have	   fewer	   independent	  directors.	  Although	   the	  authors	  do	  not	  offer	  any	   interpretation	  of	   this	   finding,	   this	  result	  suggests	   that	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  board	  structure	  and	  corruption	  and	  that	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  may	  potentially	  mediate	  the	  relationship	  between	  board	  structure	  and	  business	  performance.	  	  However,	   compared	   to	   inside	   directors,	   outside	   directors	   offer	   disadvantages	  that	   can	   influence	  negatively	   their	   effectiveness	   in	   a	  board.	   First,	   unlike	   inside	  directors,	   outside	   directors	   do	   not	   have	   a	   complete	   understanding	   of	   the	  company’s	   daily	   operations	   and	   the	   process	   of	   acquiring	   information	   on	   the	  projects	  put	   forward	  by	   the	  senior	  management	   is	   costly.	  Second,	   they	   tend	   to	  have	  generic	  knowledge	  of	   the	  business	  environment	   that	  may	  not	  necessarily	  apply	   to	   the	   specifics	   of	   the	   company	   they	   overview.	   The	   implication	   is	   that	  when	  selecting	  the	  board,	  owners	  face	  a	  trade-­‐off:	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  they	  need	  to	  appoint	  a	  board	  which	  is	  sufficiently	  independent	  from	  the	  top	  management	  (so	  it	   can	   be	   an	   effective	   monitor)	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   they	   need	   to	   select	   a	  knowledgeable	   board	   which	   can	   be	   an	   effective	   advisor	   to	   the	   senior	  management	   team.	   Theory	   suggests	   that	   companies	   balance	   this	   trade-­‐off	   by	  taking	   into	   account	   the	  nature	  of	   their	   operations.	   Indeed	   theoretical	   research	  suggests	   that	   firms	  with	  complex	  operations	   (like	  R&D	   intensive	  companies	  or	  companies	  dispersed	   geographically)	  will	   have	   a	   higher	  proportion	  of	   insiders	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  members	  who	  are	  affiliated	  with	  the	  controlling	  family	  governance	  is	  poor.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  good	  when	  the	  board	  is	  dominated	  by	  members	  who	  are	  not	  affiliated	  with	  the	  controlling	  family.	  Consistently	   with	   this	   finding,	   relative	   firm	   value	   is	   negatively	   related	   to	   board	   affiliation	   in	  family-­‐controlled	   firms.	   Dahay	   and	   McConnell	   (2007)	   examine	   the	   relation	   between	   outside	  directors	  and	  corporate	  performance	  in	  the	  UK	  companies	  between	  1989–1996,	  a	  period	  during	  which	  the	  Cadbury	  Report	  required	  companies	  to	  have	  more	  outside	  directors	  on	  publicly	  traded	  companies'	   boards.	   They	   show	   that,	   following	   the	   new	   regulation,	   companies	   that	   add	   ouside	  directors	  exhibit	  a	  significant	  improvement	  in	  operating	  performance.	  Similarly,	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  independent	  directors	  on	  firm	  performance	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  studies	  of	  Korean	  firms	  (Black	   and	   Kim,	   2012;	   Choi	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   .	   Daya	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   examine	   the	   relation	   between	  corporate	  value	  and	  boards	  comprised	  of	  independent	  directors,	  in	  companies	  with	  a	  dominant	  shareholder.	  They	  find	  a	  positive	  relationship	  especially	  in	  countries	  with	  weak	  legal	  protection	  for	   shareholders.	   They	   show	   that	   a	   dominant	   shareholder	   can	   offset	   the	   documented	   value	  discount	  associated	  with	  weak	  country	  level	  shareholder	  protection,	  through	  the	  appointment	  of	  an	   independent	   board.	   Bruno	   and	   Claessens	   (2010)	   analyse	   the	   interaction	   between	   legal	  regimes	   and	   firms'	   corporate	   governance	   practices	   and	   find	   evidence	   of	   the	   value	   to	   large	  companies	  that	  rely	  on	  external	  financing,	  of	  over-­‐regulation	  and	  governance	  practices.	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on	   the	   board	   as	   inside	   directors	   can	   provide	   a	   better	   advice	   (Raheja,	   2005;	  Adams	  and	  Ferreira,	  2007).	   	  Empirical	  evidence	  on	   this	  point	   is	   though	  mixed:	  	  Liu	   et	   al.	   (2015)	   have	   analysed	   the	   relation	   between	   board	   independence	   and	  firm	  performance	   and	   find	   evidence	   that	   the	   degree	   of	   board	   independence	   is	  positively	   related	   to	   firm	   performance,	   especially	   in	   government-­‐controlled	  firms	   and	   in	   firms	   with	   lower	   information	   acquisition	   and	   monitoring	   costs.	  However,	  Linck	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  find	  that	  R&D	  intensive	  firms	  have	  a	  preference	  for	  independent	   boards.	   Interestingly,	   Coles	   et	   al.	   (2008)	   find	   the	   opposite	   result.	  Another	  study	  has	  estimated	  the	  relationship	  between	  innovation	  performance	  and	  board	  independence	  in	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  318	  listed	  companies	  in	  China	  and	  found	   there	   is	   only	   a	   small	   correlation	   between	   innovation	   performance	   and	  independence	   of	   the	   board	   (Qianbing	   and	   Pingping,	   2010)	   suggesting	   that	  independent	  boards	  may	  not	  be	  that	  important	  in	  innovative	  firms.	  These	  results	  suggest	  that	  when	  multinationals	  have	  to	  structure	  the	  boards	  of	  their	  network	  of	   affiliates,	   they	   have	   to	   strike	   the	   right	   balance	   between	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  advice	   the	   affiliates’	   senior	  management	   team	   receives	   from	   the	   directors	   and	  their	  monitoring	   intensity	   (which	   is	  directly	   linked	   to	   the	   independence	  of	   the	  board).	  This	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  R&D	  performing	  affiliates	  that	  may	  be	  in	  need	  of	  technical	  advice	  from	  their	  board.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  What	  conclusions	  can	  we	  draw	  from	  this	  survey?	  First,	  consistently	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  corruption	  and	  poor	  quality	  institutions	  go	  hand	  in	  hand,	  corruption	  tends	  to	  shape	  the	  choices	  that	  all	  firms	  (both	  local	  and	  foreign)	  make	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  internal	   corporate	   governance	   mechanisms.	   Second,	   although	   ownership	  concentration	   is	   considered	   by	   multinationals	   the	   main	   mechanism	   through	  which	  the	  agency	  problem	  between	  management	  and	  owners	  can	  be	  solved	  in	  a	  foreign	   country,	   in	   reality	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   board	   and	   in	   particular	   its	  independence	  may	  potentially	  matter	  to	  firms,	  particularly	  if	  they	  are	  located	  in	  corrupt	  countries.	  Third,	  very	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  desirable	  structure	  of	  the	  board	  among	  multinationals’	   subsidiaries.	  The	   literature	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  is	  the	  key	  feature	  of	  a	  well-­‐performing	  subsidiary	  in	   a	   corrupt	   country.	   However,	   an	   independent	   board	   may	   not	   be	   the	   best	  advisor	  if	  the	  affiliate	  has	  very	  complex	  operations	  or	  performs	  R&D	  as	  outside	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directors	   may	   lack	   the	   necessary	   technical	   knowledge.	   If	   so,	   how	   do	  multinationals	  manage	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  advice	  from	  the	  board	   and	   their	   monitoring	   intensity?	   Are	   there	   other	   characteristics	   of	   the	  directors	  that	  are	  optimal	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  company?	  Our	  empirical	  analysis	  will	  try	  to	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  these	  unresolved	  issues.	  	  
3.	  THE	  EMPIRICAL	  MODEL,	  DATA	  AND	  VARIABLES	  
	  
3.1	  The	  innovation	  production	  function:	  the	  empirical	  specification	  
	  As	  mentioned	   in	   the	   Introduction,	   this	   section	   is	   devoted	   to	   the	  description	  of	  the	   empirical	   model	   we	   use	   to	   estimate	   the	   firm-­‐level	   innovation	   production	  function	   (Griliches,	  1990).	  To	   this	  purpose,	  we	  distinguish	  between	   innovation	  outputs	   (usually	   number	   of	   patents)	   and	   the	   innovation	   input	   (proxied	   by	   a	  firm’s	   investment	   in	   R&D).	   The	   innovation	   production	   function	   attempts	   to	  model	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  R&D	  investment	  and	  the	  innovation	  outputs.	  In	  our	  specification,	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  all	  companies	  invest	  in	  R&D	  and	   that	  R&D-­‐performing	   firms	  are	  a	   self-­‐selected	  group.	   In	  other	  words,	  there	  exists	  a	  problem	  of	  self-­‐selection	  in	  the	  sample	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  when	  estimating	  the	  innovation	  production	  function.	  In	  addition,	   investment	  in	  R&D	  is	  lumpy	  and	  therefore	  we	  may	  observe	  firms	  that	  may	  register	  a	  patent	  but	  may	  have	  not	  performed	  R&D	  over	  the	  years	  covered	  by	  our	  sample.	  To	  be	  able	  to	   address	   these	   two	   issues,	  we	   adopt	   the	   following	   approach:	   first,	  we	  model	  the	   firm-­‐level	   investment	   in	   R&D	   in	   such	   way	   that	   self-­‐selection	   is	   explicitly	  modelled;	   second,	   we	   estimate	   an	   innovation	   production	   function	   where	   the	  predicted	   (rather	   than	   the	   actual)	   R&D	   intensity	   (calculated	   from	   the	   R&D	  investment	   equation)	   appears	   as	   the	   innovation	   input.	   In	   such	   a	   way,	   the	  relationship	  between	  patents	  and	  R&D	  can	  still	  be	   investigated	   for	   those	   firms	  that	  have	  an	   innovation	  output	   even	   if	   they	  do	  not	   appear	   to	  have	   invested	   in	  R&D	  in	  our	  sample	  period.	  	  	  	  	  By	  using	  predicted	  values	  of	  R&D	  (instead	  of	   the	  actual	   investment	   in	  R&D)	   in	  the	   actual	   innovation	   production	   function,	   we	   are	   implicitly	   using	   an	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instrumental	   variable	   approach	   to	   address	   the	   potential	   reverse	   causality	  between	   the	   actual	   innovation	   output	   and	   the	   investment	   in	   R&D.	   Therefore,	  when	  we	  specify	  our	  empirical	  model,	  we	  do	  impose	  some	  exclusion	  restrictions	  based	  on	  assumptions	  which	  are	  plausible	   from	  an	  economic	  standpoint.	  More	  specifically,	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  corruption	  is	  limited	  to	  the	  investment	  in	   R&D	   while	   it	   does	   not	   influence	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   innovation	  output	  and	   the	   investment	   in	  R&D.	   In	  other	  words	  we	  assume	   that	   corruption	  may	   reduce	   the	   subsidiaries’	   incentives	   to	   invest	   in	  R&D	   (and	   its	   intensity)	   as	  funds	   may	   be	   re-­‐routed	   towards	   illicit	   transactions	   but	   not	   the	   incentive	   to	  register	  a	  patent	  once	  the	  investment	  in	  R&D	  has	  taken	  place	  and	  has	  generated	  a	  patentable	  innovation.	  	  	  	  	  	  Our	  empirical	  model	  is	  formalised	  in	  two	  stages.	  In	  Stage	  1,	  we	  model	  the	  firm’s	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  as	  well	  as	  its	  R&D	  intensity.	  In	  Stage	  2,	  we	  estimate	  the	  innovation	   production	   function	   and	   we	   assume	   that	   the	   innovation	   output	   is	  conditional	   on	   the	   predicted	   R&D	   investment	   and	   other	   firms’	   characteristics.	  We	  will	  now	  analyse	  each	  stage	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
	  
Stage	   1:	   the	   first	   two	   equations	   model	   simultaneously	   the	   firm’s	   decision	   to	  invest	   in	  R&D	  and	  its	   intensity	  using	  a	  sample	  selection	  model.	  The	  decision	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  following	  equations:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  isi =1 if	   is* = wiα +εi > 0 	  	   Ni ,....,1= 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
isi = 0 	  otherwise	  	  Where	   *is is	   an	   unobservable	   latent	   variable	  whose	   value	   determines	  whether	  the	  firm	  invests	  in	  R&D,	   is	   is	  an	  observed	  indicator	  which	  equals	  zero	  for	  firms	  that	   do	  not	   invest	   in	  R&D	  and	  one	   for	  R&D	  performing	   firms.	  w	   is	   a	   vector	   of	  variables	  explaining	   the	   investment	  decision,	  α	   is	  a	  vector	  of	  parameters	   to	  be	  estimated	  and	  εi	  is	  an	  error	  term,	  assumed	  to	  be	  Normally	  distributed.	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Conditional	  on	  firms	  investing	  in	  R&D,	  we	  observe	  the	  amount	  of	  R&D	  (modelled	  here	  as	  isi	  -­‐	  i.e.	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  R&D	  expenditure	  per	  employee):	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







isezisi β 	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  
where zi is a vector of variables affecting the innovation expenditure intensity, β is the 
vector of coefficients and ei is an error term. Assuming that the two error terms are 
distributed as a Bivariate Normal with zero mean, variances 12 =εσ and 
2
eσ , and a 
correlation coefficient ρ, the system of equations (1) and (2) can be estimated as an 
Heckman model.   We	  do	  estimate	  several	  specifications	  of	  the	  two	  equations	  in	  Stage	  1.	  The	  first	  specification	   only	   includes	   the	   log	   of	   employees	   count,	   log	   of	   the	   capital	  intensity,	   log	  of	  equity,	  market	  share,	  age	  (in	   log)	  as	  well	  as	   industry,	  year	  and	  country	   dummies	   as	   explanatory	   variables	   for	   the	   first	   step	   (probability	   of	  reporting	  positive	  R&D).	  We	   control	   for	   the	   size	  of	   the	   affiliate	   as	   larger	   firms	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  as	  they	  can	  easily	  cover	  the	  sunk	  costs	  of	   the	   investment	   unlike	   small	   firms	   (Cohen	   and	   Levin,	   1989;	   Cohen	   and	  Klepper,	  1996).	  Equally,	  the	  empirical	  literature	  suggests	  that	  older	  firms	  tend	  to	  invest	   more	   in	   R&D	   than	   younger	   ones	   because	   of	   the	   specialist	   skills	   that	  younger	  firms	  may	  lack	  (see	  for	  instance	  Zahra	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  We	  also	  control	  for	  the	  affiliates’	   capital	   intensity	   that	   is	  positively	   correlated	   to	   the	  propensity	   to	  invest	   in	  R&D	   among	   large	   firms.	  We	   also	   control	   for	   the	  market	   share	   of	   the	  subsidiary	  as	  a	  few	  papers	  have	  suggested	  that	  firms	  with	  a	  large	  market	  share	  innovate	  more	  so	  to	  maintain	  their	  position	  in	  the	  market	  (Blundell	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  The	   availability	   of	   equity	   capital	   is	   known	   to	   be	   positively	   correlated	   to	  investment	  in	  R&D	  as	  this	  has	  high	  upfront	  costs	  that	  tend	  to	  be	  met	  by	  available	  financial	   resources	   (i.e.	   equity)	   rather	   than	   by	   external	   funding	   (Mueller	   and	  Zimmermann,	   2014).	   Finally,	   industry	   dummies	   capture	   the	   technological	  characteristics	   of	   the	   sector	   which	  may	   influence	   the	   firm-­‐level	   propensity	   to	  invest	   in	   R&D	   (or	   its	   intensity)19	  or	   the	   industry-­‐level	   appropriability	   regime	  (see	  Mairesse	   and	  Mohnen,	   2002)	  while	   country	   dummy	   control	   for	   the	   time-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This way, we can control for the technology-pull factors that may influence the investment in R&D. 
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invariant	  characteristics	  of	  the	  host	  country	  that	  may	  be	  correlated	  to	  either	  the	  propensity	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  or	  its	  intensity	  (like	  the	  legislation	  on	  the	  protection	  of	   a	   firm’s	   intellectual	   property	   or	   the	   time-­‐invariant	   characteristics	   of	   the	  corporate	  governance	  system	  in	  each	  country).	  	  	  In	   a	   second	   specification,	   we	   include	   a	   variable	   indicating	   the	   number	   of	  subsidiaries	   controlled	   by	   the	   parent	   company	   so	   to	   control	   for	   potential	  economies	   of	   scale	   within	   the	   local	   network	   of	   affiliates.	   We	   also	   attempt	   to	  control	   for	  the	  fact	  that	  firms	  which	  have	  been	  successful	   in	  transforming	  R&D	  investment	  in	  high-­‐value	  patentable	  inventions	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  (so	  called	  “success-­‐breed-­‐success”	  hypothesis)	  and	  we	  do	  so	  by	  introducing	   a	   set	   of	   dummies	   taking	   the	   value	   of	   one	   if	   any	   of	   the	   patents	  registered	   by	   each	   affiliate	   has	   been	   cited	   by	   another	   patent	   in	   the	   previous	  years.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  final	  specification,	  we	  introduce	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	   the	   company	   has	   collaborated	   with	   an	   external	   organisation	   for	   the	  development	   of	   a	   patentable	   invention	   and	   zero	   otherwise.	   Several	   authors	  suggest	  that	  collaboration	  stimulates	  further	  R&D	  investment	  by	  allowing	  firms	  to	  share	  costs	  and	  internalising	  knowledge	  spillovers	  (see	  Kamien	  et	  al.,	  1992).	  This	  variable	  also	  allows	  to	  control	  for	  the	  use	  of	  external	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  when	   investing	   in	  R&D	   (Crespi	   and	  Zuniga,	  2012;	  Griffith	  et	  al.,	   2006).	   Finally,	  we	   introduce	  our	  variables	  of	   interest:	   a	  dummy	   taking	   the	  value	  of	  one	   if	   the	  companies	   that	   own	   more	   than	   50%	   of	   the	   subsidiary’s	   shares	   are	   from	  Common	  Law	  countries20,	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  board	  independence,	  the	  perceived	  level	   of	   corruption	   in	   the	   country	   and	   the	   interaction	   between	   the	   last	   two	  variables.	   As	   majority	   shareholders	   may	   use	   ownership	   concentration	   to	  insulate	   the	   affiliates	   from	   the	   effects	   of	   corruption,	  we	   expect	   that	   in	   corrupt	  countries	   owning	  more	   than	   50%	   percent	   of	   the	   affiliates’	   shares	   is	   common.	  Therefore	  we	   interact	   the	   ownership	  dummy	  with	   the	   indicator	   of	   corruption.	  The	   variables	   in	   level	   and	   their	   interactions	   are	   included	   only	   in	   the	   R&D	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This is an important control variable as in the case of affiliates that are partially owned, the 
relationship between the independence of the board and the R&D intensity may be driven by the 
presence of a second majority shareholder from another common law country. 
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intensity	   equation	   as	   they	   are	   assumed	   to	   affect	   the	   R&D	   intensity	   (intensive	  margin)	  but	  not	   the	  probability	  of	  performing	  R&D	   (extensive	  margin).	   In	   this	  specification,	   we	   also	   control	   for	   the	   size	   of	   the	   board	   as	   a	   few	   studies	   have	  found	   that	   the	   size	   of	   the	   board	   can	   influence	   the	   performance	   of	   a	   company	  (Coles	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  	  Econometrically,	  we	   use	   a	   two-­‐step	  Heckman	   selection	  model	   to	   estimate	   our	  three	   specifications.	   However,	   it	   can	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   R&D	   intensity	   of	   an	  affiliate	  can	  influence	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  board	  and	  therefore	  its	  independence.	  Indeed,	   there	   exists	   a	   large	   literature	   that	   points	   out	   that	   R&D	   intensity	   is	  endogenous	   to	   the	   board	   independence	   (see	   Coles	   et	   al,	   2008	   and	   Linck	   et	   al,	  2008	  for	  example).	  While	  there	  are	  no	  problems	  with	  the	  potential	  endogeneity	  in	   the	   case	   of	   the	   first	   two	   specifications,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case	   with	   the	   third	  specification.	   We	   therefore	   use	   an	   IV	   estimator	   to	   address	   the	   potential	  endogeneity	   between	   the	   R&D	   intensity	   and	   the	   board	   independence	   (and	   its	  interaction	   with	   our	   indicator	   of	   corruption)	   while	   correcting	   for	   the	   sample	  selection	  as	  in	  Wooldridge	  (2010).	  According	  to	  the	  literature,	  a	  valid	  instrument	  must	  meet	   two	   criteria:	   a	   strong	   correlation	  with	   the	   instrumented	   regressors	  and	   orthogonality	   with	   the	   error	   term.	   We	   choose	   the	   following	   three	  instruments	  for	  the	  measure	  of	  board	  independence:	  a)	  the	  average	  proportion	  of	   foreign	   executives	   with	   no	   local	   business	   connections	   that	   work	   for	   other	  multinationals	   in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	   industry,	  country	  and	  year,	  b)	   the	  density	  of	  multinationals	   in	   the	   same	   region	   (NUTS2),	   country	   and	   year	   and	   c)	   the	  proportion	   of	   female	   executives	   below	   50	   years	   old	   who	   work	   for	   other	  multinationals	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	   industry,	  country	  and	  year.	  The	  rationale	  for	  the	   choice	   of	   these	   three	   instruments	   is	   the	   following.	   Affiliates’	   governance	  arrangements	  tend	  to	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  industry	  average	  because	  they	  have	  similar	  business	  and	  technological	  opportunities	  although	  the	  industry	  average	  is	   unlikely	   to	   affect	   the	   individual	   choice	   that	   affiliates	   make.	   We	   focus	   on	  executives	  from	  multinationals	  because	  multinationals	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  complex	  organisations	  than	  other	  types	  of	  companies	  and	  therefore	  its	  directors	  need	  to	  have	  special	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  that	  can	  only	  be	  found	  in	  executives	  working	  for	  other	  multinationals.	  The	  presence	  in	  an	  industry	  and	  in	  a	  country	  of	  a	  large	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pool	   of	   executives	   with	   no	   local	   business	   connections	   makes	   it	   easier	   for	  multinationals	   to	  set	  up	  an	   independent	  board.	  Foreign	  executives	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  strong	  business	  links	  in	  the	  country	  they	  work	  and	  the	  same	  applies	  to	  young,	   female	   executives	   who	   have	   not	   had	   enough	   time	   to	   develop	   major	  business	   connections.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   multinational	   has	   interest	   in	  sourcing	  its	  potential	  directors	  from	  the	  same	  industry	  its	  affiliate	  belongs	  to	  so	  that	   the	  potential	  directors	   can	  provide	   the	   senior	  management	  of	   the	  affiliate	  with	   high-­‐quality	   advice.	   Finally,	   the	   density	   of	  multinationals	   in	   a	   region	   and	  country	  wants	   to	   capture	   the	   size	   of	   the	   pool	   from	  which	   a	  multinational	   can	  source	  directors	  (Knyazeva	  et	  al,	  2013).	  	  
Stage	   2.	   	   In	   the	   second	   stage,	   we	   estimate	   the	   production	   of	   innovation	  conditional	  on	  the	  R&D	  intensity	  estimated	  in	  the	  first	  stage.	  Registered	  patents	  are	  our	  main	   indicator	  of	   innovation	  output.	  However,	  not	  all	   the	  patents	  have	  the	  same	  value	  as	  some	  innovations	  may	  be	  more	  valuable	  than	  others.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  we	  use	   the	  number	  of	   forward	   citations	   (i.e.	   the	   citations	   received	  by	  the	  patents	  registered	  by	  a	  firms	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  registered	  patents)	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  patent	  quality	  in	  line	  with	  earlier	  papers	  which	  have	  shown	  that	   forward	   citations	   are	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	   monetary	   value	   of	   a	  patent	   (Harhoff	   et	   al.,	   1999;	   Lanjouw	   and	   Schankerman,	   2001;	   Trajtenberg,	  1990).	  	  As	  the	   innovation	  output	   is	  a	  count	  variable,	   the	  OLS	  estimates	  are	   likely	  to	  be	  biased	  and	  produce	  negative	  predicted	  values.	  The	  baseline	  model	  that	  allows	  to	  deal	  with	  count	  dependent	  variables	  is	  the	  Poisson	  model	  which	  assumes	  equi-­‐dispersion	  (mean	  equal	  to	  the	  variance)	  of	  the	  variable	  of	  interest.	  This	  property	  is	   often	   violated	   with	   innovation	   data	   (either	   patents	   or	   citations),	   which	   are	  generally	  characterized	  by	  over-­‐dispersion.	  Therefore	  to	  estimate	  the	  innovation	  production	   function,	   we	   use	   the	   negative	   binomial	   regression	   model	   which	  allows	   the	   conditional	   variance	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable	   to	   be	   a	   quadratic	  function	  of	  the	  conditional	  mean.	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The	  key	   independent	  variable	   in	  Stage	  2	  (and	  appearing	   in	  all	   the	  equations	  of	  Stage	  2)	  is	  the	  predicted	  value	  of	  the	  log	  of	  the	  innovation	  expenditure	  intensity	  (derived	  from	  the	  first	  stage	  estimates).	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  this	  way	  the	  model	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  innovation	  expenditure	  is	  endogenous	  to	  the	  production	  of	  innovation.	  Like	  in	  Griffith	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  the	  predicted	  values	  from	  the	   first	   stage	   estimation	   computed	   for	   all	   firms	   (taking	   into	   account	   the	  probability	   that	   their	   R&D	   expenditure	   is	   observed)	   are	   used	   to	   proxy	  innovation	  effort	  in	  the	  innovation	  production	  function.	  This	  approach	  assumes	  that	  a	  firm	  that	  reports	  no	  R&D	  expenditure	  may	  have	  still	  have	  some	  informal	  expenditure	  related	  to	  innovation.	  	  	  	  The	   innovation	   production	   function	   shares	   with	   the	   equations	   from	   Stage	   1	  some	  independent	  variables,	  like	  the	  employee	  counts,	  age,	  capital	  intensity	  and	  the	   dummies	   for	   past	   patents/citations.	   The	   rationale	   for	   including	   capital	  intensity	  and	  the	  dummies	  for	  the	  past	  patents/citations	  among	  the	  regressors	  of	  the	  R&D	  equations	  is	  quite	  similar	  to	  the	  one	  offered	  in	  the	  previous	  stage.	  As	  for	   the	   other	   regressors,	   older	   and	   larger	   firms	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   register	  patents	   (which	   may	   also	   be	   more	   valuable)	   as	   they	   have	   the	   necessary	  experience	   and	   capability	   to	   transform	   their	   R&D	   investment	   into	   patentable	  inventions.	  Arundel	  (2001)	  finds	  that	  large	  firms	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  patent	  than	  small	   firms.	   This	   is	   true	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   small	   firms	   do	   not	   have	   the	  financial	  resources	  to	  defend	  legally	  their	  patent	  and	  so	  may	  be	  less	  inclined	  to	  patent	  and	  use	  alternative	  appropriability	  mechanisms.	  Second,	  small	  firms	  are	  rarely	   involved	   in	   cross-­‐licensing	   arrangements	   and	   therefore	   the	   costs	   of	  enforcing	  a	  patent	  tend	  to	  be	  much	  larger	  for	  them	  than	  for	  large	  firms.	  Finally,	  we	   introduce	   industry	   dummies	   that	   control	   for	   sector-­‐specific	   propensity	   to	  register	  a	  patent.	  We	  use	  the	  Pavitt’s	  taxonomy	  to	  this	  purpose	  as	  they	  capture	  better	   than	   the	   standard	   SIC	   classification	   the	   industrial	   differences	   in	   the	  attitudes	  to	  patenting.	  Indeed,	  according	  to	  Pavitt	  (1984),	  firms	  in	  science-­‐based	  and	   specialized	   suppliers	   sectors	   tend	   to	  use	  patents	  more	   than	   firms	   in	   scale	  intensive	   and	   supplier	   dominated	   sectors.	   Finally,	   year	   and	   country	   dummies	  control	  for	  time	  trends	  and	  for	  country-­‐level	  differences	  in	  legal	  institutions.	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3.2	  The	  data	  and	  the	  variables	  
	  The	  data	   are	   from	   three	  primary	   sources:	   the	  Amadeus	  database	   from	  Bureau	  Van	  Dijk's	  (BvD),	  the	  European	  Patent	  Office	  (EPO)	  database	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  ‘Governance	   Matters’	   databases	   (Kaufmann	   et	   al.,	   2005,	   1999).	   Our	   sample	  period	  goes	  from	  2005	  to	  2013.	  Amadeus	  provides	  financial	  annual	  accounting	  information	  for	  over	  ten	  million	  companies	   in	  Europe.	  The	  annual	  data	   include	  24	   balance	   sheets	   items,	   25	   profit	   and	   loss	   account	   items	   and	   26	   ratios.	   The	  database	   includes	   the	   Eurostat	   NACE	   codes	   that	   allow	   to	   sort	   the	   companies	  according	   to	   their	   industrial	   sector.	   The	   use	   of	   balance	   sheet	   data	   for	   our	  analysis	  offers	  some	  benefits	  as	  they	  have	  to	  be	  submitted	  by	  companies	  every	  year	   with	   the	   result	   that	   the	   coverage	   of	   the	   sample	   is	  more	   exhaustive	   than	  what	  we	  would	  expect	  otherwise.	  	  	  To	  construct	   the	  sample,	  we	  have	   followed	  the	   following	  steps.	  First,	  using	   the	  Eurostat	  NACE	  codes	   for	   the	   industrial	   sectors,	  we	  have	   identified	  a	   sample	  of	  UK	   multinational	   enterprises	   belonging	   to	   the	   manufacturing	   sector	   (NACE	  codes	  11	  to	  33).	  By	  focusing	  on	  UK-­‐only	  multinationals,	  we	  have	  eliminated	  the	  need	   to	   control	   for	   the	   additional	   cross-­‐country	   heterogeneity	   due	   to	   the	  inclusion	  of	  companies	  that	  are	  affiliated	  to	  multinationals	  from	  countries	  other	  than	  UK.	  Second,	  we	  have	  identified	  the	  affiliates	  of	  these	  multinationals	  located	  in	   Europe	   and	   selected	   only	   those	   belonging	   to	   manufacturing.	   Among	   the	  affiliates	   in	   our	   sample,	   we	   have	   focused	   on	   those	   that	   are	   either	   fully	   or	  partially	  owned21	  by	  the	  parent	  company.	  We	  have	  removed	  some	  observations	  because	  of	  missing	  values	  in	  relevant	  variables	  and	  removed	  the	  top	  and	  lower	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  observations	  in	  the	  sample.	  The	  final	  dataset	   includes	  1,390	  UK	   manufacturing	   companies	   and	   4,100	   affiliates,	   located	   in	   30	   countries22.	  Monetary	   variables	   have	   been	   deflated	   by	   the	   appropriate	   international	  deflators.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 At least 25% of the shares of an affiliate need to be owned by the UK-based parent company.  22	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  Bulgaria,	  Croatia,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Denmark,	  Estonia,	  Finland,	   France,	   Germany,	   Greece,	   Hungary,	   Ireland,	   Italy,	   Latvia,	   Luxembourg,	   Malta,	  Netherlands,	  Norway,	  Poland,	  Portugal,	  Romania,	  Russian	  Federation,	  Serbia,	  Slovakia,	  Slovenia,	  Spain,	  Sweden,	  Ukraine.	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  The	   EPO	  data	   are	   from	   the	  Worldwide	   Patent	   Statistical	  Database	   (PATSTAT),	  which	   includes	   patents	   from	   81	   national	   and	   international	   patent	   offices,	  detailed	  information	  on	  patents	  published	  in	  the	  EU,	  and	  citations	  from/to	  EPO	  and	  non-­‐EPO	  patents,	   that	   is,	  backward	  and	  forward	  citations	  to	  other	  patents.	  We	  have	  collected	  data	  on	  the	  number	  of	  patents	  registered	  by	  the	  affiliates	   in	  our	   sample	   between	   2005	   and	   2013	   and	  matched	   to	   each	   company	   using	   the	  identifier	  provided	  by	  Amadeus.	  	  
3.2	  The	  variables	  and	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  
Affiliate-­‐level	  variables	  	  For	   each	   affiliate	   we	   have	   data	   on	   the	   number	   of	   employees,	   equity	   (the	  difference	   between	   assets	   and	   liabilities),	   fixed	   assets,	   market	   share	   and	   age.	  Market	  share	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  company’s	  sales	  to	  the	  total	  3-­‐digit	  industry	   sales.	   Patents	   documents	   report	   the	   number	   of	   collaborators	   in	   the	  development	   of	   the	   patented	   invention.	   A	   patent	   can	   be	   the	   output	   of	   an	  individual	   firm's	   R&D	   investment	   or	   the	   result	   of	   a	   collaborative	   agreement	  among	  two	  or	  more	  firms.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  all	  the	  companies	  involved	  are	  listed	  in	   the	   patent	   documents.	   From	   the	   patent	   documentation,	   we	   calculate	   the	  number	   of	   organisations	   that	   have	   collaborated	   with	   each	   affiliate	   for	   the	  development	  of	  the	  patented	  invention	  and	  create	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  one	   if	   the	  company	  has	  collaborated	  with	  an	  external	  organisation	   for	  the	  development	  of	  an	  innovation	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  	  	  We	  employ	  three	  common	  proxies	  for	  innovation:	  R&D	  intensity,	  patent	  counts	  and	   number	   of	   forward	   citations	   received	   by	   a	   given	   patent.	   We	   define	   R&D	  intensity	  as	  the	  logarithm	  of	  the	  ratio	  between	  R&D	  expenditure	  (proxied	  by	  the	  investment	  in	  intangible	  fixed	  assets)23	  and	  fixed	  assets.	  Since	  patents	  represent	  exclusive	   rights	   to	   a	   particular	   invention	   (Hsu	   et	   al.,	   2015),	   patents	   is	   the	  standard	   indicator	   of	   corporate	   innovation.	   Finally,	   we	   take	   the	   number	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 R&D expenditure can be reported both in the balance sheet (under the item “intangible fixed assets”) 
and in the income statement. Generally value-generating R&D expenditure is recorded as an asset.  
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citations	   received	   by	   a	   patent	   to	   proxy	   for	   their	   quality	   (Hall	   et	   al.,	   2005;	  Trajtenberg,	  1990).	  Citations	  to	  patents	  accumulate	  over	  the	  years	  and	  follow	  a	  scale	  free	  distribution;	  only	  a	  few	  patents	  are	  cited	  repeatedly	  while	  the	  majority	  receives	   no	   citations.	   The	   citation	   counts	   are	   calculated	   as	   the	   sum	   of	   the	  citations	  received	  yearly	  by	  the	  stock	  of	  patents	  owned	  by	  the	  affiliate.	  	  	  
Corruption	  	  As	  an	  indicator	  of	  corruption,	  we	  use	  the	  Control	  of	  Corruption	  Indicator	  (CCI),	  first	   introduced	   by	   Kaufmann	   et	   al.	   (1999)	   and	   updated	   by	   Kaufmann	   et	   al.	  (2005).	   The	   Control	   of	   Corruption	   indicator	   is	   included	   in	   the	   World	   Bank's	  series	   of	   governance	   indicators	   and	   is	   part	   of	   a	   set	   of	   six	   aggregate	   indicators	  corresponding	   to	   six	   basic	   governance	   concepts	   (Voice	   and	   Accountability,	  Political	  Instability	  and	  Violence,	  Government	  Effectiveness,	  Regulatory	  Quality,	  Rule	   of	   Law	   and	   Control	   of	   Corruption).	   These	   indicators	   have	   been	   used	   to	  assess	   how	   governance	   varies	   across	   countries	   and	   over	   time.	   Control	   of	  corruption	   captures	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   public	   power	   is	   exercised	   for	   private	  gain	  and	  captures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  public	  power	  is	  exercised	  for	  private	  gain	  including	   petty,	   grand	   forms	   of	   corruption	   and	   'state	   capture'	   by	   elites	   and	  private	  interests.	   It	   is	  constructed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   larger	  values	  of	  the	  index	  are	  associated	   to	   less	  corrupt	  countries.	  Control	  of	  Corruption	   is	  essentially	  an	  indicator	   of	   the	   perception	   of	   corruption	   and	   although	   some	   authors	   argue	  against	  attempts	  to	  measure	  corruption	  perception	  rather	  than	  corruption	  itself	  (Olken,	  2009),	  it	  remains	  a	  widely	  used	  measure	  of	  corruption	  (Aidt	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Seligson,	  2006).	  	  For	  our	  analysis,	  we	  have	  created	  a	  dummy	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  is	  larger	  than	  1.5	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  Countries	  in	   this	   category	   include	   Ireland,	   Austria,	   Germany,	   Luxembourg,	   Norway,	  Netherlands,	  Sweden,	  Finland	  and	  Denmark.	  This	  way,	  we	  can	  capture	  eventual	  non-­‐linearities	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	   corruption	   and	   the	  performance	  of	  the	  affiliates.	  Indeed,	  several	  papers	  have	  argued	  that	  corruption	  tends	  to	  have	  a	  detrimental	   impact	   on	   the	   performance	   of	   the	   affiliates	   only	   if	   the	   level	   of	  corruption	  is	  very	  high	  (Pal,	  2013).	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Information	  on	  corporate	  governance	  
	  From	  the	  Amadeus	  database,	  we	  have	  collected	  information	  on	  the	  composition	  of	   the	   affiliates’	   corporate	   boards	   to	   calculate	   the	   independence	   of	   directors.	  Following	   the	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	   Commission	   (SEC)	   rules,	   we	   define	   a	  director	   as	   independent	   if	   he/she	   has	   no	   business,	   employment,	   consulting	   or	  family	  based	  affiliation	  with	  the	  firm	  or	  any	  of	  its	  subsidiaries	  other	  than	  his/her	  role	   as	   a	   member	   of	   the	   firm's	   board.	   An	   independent	   director	   also	   is	   not	   in	  receipt	   of	   consulting	   or	   advisory	   fees	   or	   compensation	   other	   than	   those	  normally	  associated	  with	   the	  directorate	  role.24	  The	  proportion	  of	   independent	  directors	  in	  each	  board	  is	  then	  used	  to	  calculate	  for	  each	  affiliate	  an	  indicator	  of	  board	  independence	  relative	  to	  the	  median	  proportion	  of	  independent	  directors	  in	  other	  firms25	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  and	  country	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  regulations26.	   Finally,	  we	   compute	   the	   size	   of	   the	   board.	   The	   literature	   on	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  board	  structure	  and	  company’s	  performance	  suggests	  that	  large	  boards	  may	  be	  not	  be	  effective	  advisors	  and	  monitors	  because	  of	  the	  coordination	   costs	   associated	   to	   the	  management	   of	   a	   large	   board.	   Lipton	   and	  Lorsch	   (1992)	   and	   Jensen	   (1993)	   suggest	   there	   exists	   an	   optimal	   size	   of	   the	  board	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  8	  or	  9	  directors.	  We	  therefore	  calculate	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	   to	   1	   if	   the	   board	   of	   the	   affiliate	   has	   more	   than	   nine	   directors	   and	   0	  otherwise.	   	   We	   also	   compute	   the	   proportion	   of	   directors	   who	   have	   only	  relationships	  with	  companies	  outside	  the	  country	  where	  the	  affiliate	  (on	  whose	  board	   he/she	   sits)	   is	   located.	   We	   compute	   the	   average	   age	   of	   the	   directors	  (based	  on	  the	  year	  they	  got	  their	  first	  degree)	  for	  each	  affiliate	  to	  proxy	  for	  their	  experience	   and	   possibly	   their	   attitudes	   towards	   risk.	   Finally,	   we	   derive	   the	  gender	   and	   the	   nationality	   of	   each	   director	   based	   on	   their	   names	   and	   their	  prefix.	  	  The	   database	   contains	   detailed	   information	   on	   the	   ownership	   structure	   of	   the	  affiliates.	  For	  each	  affiliate,	  we	  can	  identify	  all	  the	  shareholders	  and	  where	  they	  are	   headquartered.	   This	   way	   we	   can	   identify	   the	   shareholders	   from	   Common	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For details refer to the SEC Rule Release No. 34–48745 (SEC, 2003b). 
25 In this case, we have considered all firms in the country and not only the foreign affiliates.   
26 We thank the Associate Editor for this suggestion.  
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Law	  countries	  (and	  therefore	  with	  corporate	  governance	  mechanisms	  which	  are	  different	   from	   those	   employed	   in	   the	   countries	   that	   are	   in	   our	   sample)	   and	  create	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  1	  if	  the	  majority	  of	  shareholders	  is	  from	  Common	  Law	  countries	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  	  	  	  	  
Basic	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  Table	  1	  provides	  the	  basic	  descriptive	  statistics	  (mean	  and	  standard	  deviation)	  by	  country	  and	  for	  the	  whole	  estimation	  sample.	  These	  figures	  offer	  interesting	  insights	  on	  how	  our	  variables	  of	  interest	  vary	  across	  the	  sample.	  The	  (average)	  largest	  values	  of	  R&D	  intensity	  tend	  to	  be	  recorded	  in	  Ireland	  and	  Scandinavian	  countries.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   lowest	   values	   are	   recorded	   for	   Eastern	  European	   countries	   although	   with	   some	   difference	   between	   Poland,	   Czech	  Republic	   and	   Slovakia	   and	   the	   remaining	   countries	   from	   Eastern	   Europe.	   On	  average,	   the	   affiliates	   are	   22	   years	   old	   and	   tend	   to	   be	   rather	   large	   with	   the	  average	   number	   of	   employees	   being	   256.	   However,	   the	   average	   age	   of	   the	  affiliates	  in	  Luxembourg,	  Denmark	  and	  Russia	  is	  above	  the	  sample	  average	  while	  the	   youngest	   affiliates	   are	   in	   Lithuania,	   Bulgaria	   and	   Bosnia.	   The	   smallest	  affiliates	  are	   in	  Croatia	  (52	  employees	  on	  average)	  while	  the	   largest	  one	  are	   in	  the	   Russian	   Federation	   (783	   employees	   on	   average).	   The	   average	   number	   of	  collaborators	   is	   1	   but	   Swedish	   affiliates	   collaborate	   with	   25	   external	  organisations	  on	  average	  while	  in	  the	  number	  of	  collaborators	  becomes	  zero	  for	  eastern	   European	   countries.	   On	   average,	   our	   affiliates	   register	   5	   patents	   on	  average	   over	   the	   sample	   period.	   The	   maximum	   number	   of	   patents	   (92)	   is	  recorded	   in	   Sweden	   which	   is	   also	   the	   country	   with	   the	   largest	   number	   of	  external	  collaborators.	  The	  average	  sum	  of	  forward	  citations	  per	  firm	  is	  around	  13	  although	  the	  standard	  deviation	  is	  rather	  large.	  There	  is	  a	   large	  variation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  among	  the	  countries	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  The	  average	  value	   of	   the	   control	   of	   corruption	   index	   is	   1.12	  with	   the	  maximum	  being	   2.55	  (corresponding	   to	   Denmark)	   and	   the	  minimum	   being	   -­‐1.09	   (corresponding	   to	  the	  Russian	  Federation).	  In	  terms	  of	  ownership,	  on	  average	  42%	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  our	   sample	   is	   controlled	   (i.e.	   the	  parent	   company	  owns	  more	   than	  50%	  of	   the	  affiliates’	   shares)	   by	   the	   multinationals	   although	   this	   figure	   varies	   across	  countries:	   the	   percentage	   goes	   up	   to	   66%	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Sweden	   and	  Bulgaria	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while	  it	  goes	  down	  to	  zero	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Lithuania.	  Figures	  1-­‐4	  show	  graphically	  the	  variation	  (both	  over	  time	  and	  across	  countries)	  of	  some	  of	  the	  key	  variables	  in	  our	  analysis,	  namely	   the	  Control	  of	  Corruption	   index,	   the	  R&D	   intensity,	   the	  percentage	   of	   shares	   owned	   by	   the	   UK	   parent	   company	   and	   the	   board	  independence	  index.	  Table	  2	  reports	  the	  values	  of	  the	  correlation	  indexes	  among	  the	   main	   variables	   in	   our	   sample:	   the	   values	   of	   the	   indexes	   indicate	   that	  potential	  correlation	  among	  the	  variables	  is	  not	  a	  problem.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  legal	  tradition,	  most	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  belong	  to	  the	  civil	   law	  tradition	  (see	  Table	  3)	  as	  defined	  by	  La	  Porta	  et	  al.	  (1998)27.	  We	  have	  classified	  the	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  revised	  anti-­‐director	  rights	  index	  calculated	   by	  Djankov	   et	   al.	   (2008)28	  (see	  Table	   4).	   The	   (time-­‐invariant)	   index	  summarises	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  legislation	  protects	  the	  minority	  shareholders	  in	  the	   corporate	   decision-­‐making	   process	   (as	   of	   2003)	   and	   larger	   values	   are	  associated	   to	   countries	   whose	   legislation	   is	   more	   favourable	   to	   minority	  shareholders.	   In	   terms	   of	   the	   anti-­‐director	   rights	   index,	   we	   find	   that	   the	  countries	   in	   our	   sample	   score	   between	   2	   and	   5	   with	   most	   countries	   scoring	  between	  3	  and	  4.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  classified	  the	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   their	   political	   risk	   (Table	   5).	  We	   have	   used	   the	   Law	   and	   Order	   index	  which	  is	  computed	  by	  the	  PRS	  group.	  The	  index	  ranks	  the	  countries	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   strength	  and	   impartiality	  of	   the	   legal	   system	  as	  well	   as	  on	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   law	   is	   generally	   observed	   in	   the	   country.	   The	   index	   is	   time-­‐varying	   in	  principle	  with	  larger	  values	  of	  the	  index	  being	  associated	  to	  countries	  which	  are	  less	  risky.	  In	  practice,	  the	  index	  tends	  to	  be	  constant	  over	  time	  in	  most	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  with	  very	  small	   changes	  recorded	  only	   for	  a	  couple	  of	   countries	  from	  Eastern	  Europe.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  we	  report	  in	  Table	  5	  the	  average	  value	  of	   the	   index	   for	   each	   country.	   Most	   countries	   in	   our	   sample	   have	   an	   index	  between	  5	  and	  6.	  Most	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  score	  4	  while	  a	  few	  countries	  from	  Western	  Europe	  score	  5	  (with	  Italy	  being	  the	  remarkable	  exception	  to	  this	  pattern).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The index by La Porta et al. (1998) (LLSV) is not available for all the countries in our sample.   
28 This index is not available for all the countries in our sample. 
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These	   three	   indexes	  can	  also	  help	  understand	  whether	   local	   institutions	  shape	  the	   structure	  of	   the	  board.	  To	   this	  purpose,	  we	  have	  plotted	   the	  percentage	  of	  outside	   directors	   (calculated	   only	   for	   the	   affiliates	   that	   are	   in	   our	   sample)	  against	   each	   of	   the	   three	   indexes	   mentioned	   above	   i.e.	   the	   LLSV	   index,	   the	  revised	  anti-­‐director	  rights	  index	  and	  the	  ICRG	  Law	  and	  Order	  index.	  These	  plots	  are	   in	   Figures	   5-­‐7.	   From	   Figure	   5,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   percentage	   of	   outside	  directors	  varies	  across	  countries	  from	  the	  civil	  law	  tradition	  while	  this	  is	  less	  so	  for	  countries	  from	  the	  Germanic	  and	  Scandinavian	  law	  traditions.	  Figure	  6	  plots	  the	  percentage	  of	  independent	  directors	  against	  the	  revised	  anti-­‐director	  rights	  index.	   In	   this	   case,	   countries	  with	   an	   average	   value	   of	   the	   anti-­‐director	   rights	  index	  may	   still	   host	   affiliates	  with	   either	   a	   large	   or	   a	   small	   fraction	   of	   outside	  directors.	  Finally,	  Figure	  7	  plots	  the	  percentage	  of	  independent	  directors	  against	  the	   ICRG	   Law	   and	   Order	   index.	   For	   each	   value	   of	   the	   index,	   the	   fraction	   of	  independent	   directors	   varies	   a	   lot	   across	   the	   different	   countries.	   We	   have	  calculated	   the	   correlation	   indexes	  between	   the	  board	   independence	   index	   and	  each	   of	   the	   three	   indexes.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   legal	   tradition	   indicator,	   the	  correlation	  is	  0.03	  while	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  anti-­‐director	  rights	  index	  it	  is	  equal	  to	  –	  0.11.	  Finally,	   in	   the	   case	  of	   the	   ICRG	  Law	  and	  Order	   index,	   the	   correlation	   is	  0.088.	   All	   in	   all,	   these	   are	   weak	   correlations	   suggesting	   that	   legal	   institutions	  alone	   cannot	   explain	   the	   different	   choices	   that	   firms	   make	   in	   terms	   of	   board	  structure.	  	  
4.	  THE	  RESULTS	  
	  Tables	  6	  and	  8	  present	  the	  main	  estimates	  of	  our	  model29	  with	  Table	  6	  showing	  the	   estimates	   of	   the	  R&D	   investment	   equations	   (Stage	  1)	  while	   in	  Table	  8,	  we	  report	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  two	  counts	  models	  (Stage	  2).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 These estimates refer to the total number of countries in our sample. However, some these countries 
allow two-tiered boards and to avoid the possibility that this would bias the results, we have re-run our 
model without these countries. The main results still hold. We have tried to control for quality of 
protection of the minority shareholder rights by introducing the CGI indicators but for our sample 
period and our countries, there is very little variation of these indicators with the result that the country 
dummies should be able to control for the cross-country differences in the legislation on the rights of 
the minority shareholders.  
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Stage	   1.	   Table	   6	   presents	   a	   variety	   of	   empirical	   specifications	   of	   the	   R&D	  investment	   equations.	   The	   results	   show	   that	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   sample	   selection	  model	   with	   correlated	   disturbances	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   data.	   The	   test	   of	  significance	  of	   the	   Inverse	  Mills	  Ratio	   (IMR)	  shows	   that	   it	   is	  always	  significant	  across	  all	   the	  different	  models.	  The	  signs	  of	  the	  ratios	  (not	  shown	  in	  the	  table)	  are	  always	  positive	  implying	  that	  firms	  investing	  in	  R&D	  (even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  predicted	  to)	  also	  have	  higher	  R&D	  than	  predicted.	   	  The	  third	  specification	  controls	   for	   the	   endogeneity	   of	   the	   board	   independence	   index	   and	   of	   its	  interaction	  with	   the	   indicator	   of	   corruption.	   The	   Cragg-­‐Donald	   test30	  confirms	  that	  the	  instruments	  are	  not	  weak	  at	  5%31	  while	  the	  over-­‐identification	  test	  does	  not	  reject	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  our	  instruments	  are	  exogenous.	  We	  have	  tested	  for	  the	  misspecification	  of	   the	  outcome	  equation	  due	   to	  omitted	  variables	  and	   the	  result	   of	   the	   test	   suggests	   there	   is	   no	   misspecification	   (the	   p-­‐value	   is	   indeed	  equal	  to	  0.3053).	  	  We	  start	   from	  a	  simple	  specification	  of	   the	   two	  equations	  where	  age,	  workers,	  fixed	   assets	   (all	   in	   logs)	   and	  market	   share	   are	   the	   regressors	   shared	   by	   both	  equations	   with	   the	   variable	   equity	   appears	   only	   in	   the	   equation	   on	   the	  propensity	   to	   invest	   in	   R&D32.	   The	   probability	   of	   reporting	   positive	   R&D	   is	  positively	   and	   significantly	   related	   to	   firm	   size	   but	   not	   to	   age.	   The	   positive	  correlation	   between	   firm	   size	   and	   the	   probability	   of	   performing	   R&D	   is	   a	  standard	   result	   when	   estimating	   R&D	   investment	   equations:	   bigger	   firms	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   willing	   to	   bear	   the	   initial	   sunk	   costs	   attached	   to	   R&D	  investment,	   they	   have	   easier	   access	   to	   credit	   and	   they	   are	   more	   capable	   of	  bearing	   the	   risk	   related	   to	   R&D	   investment	   whose	   returns	   can	   be	   highly	  uncertain.	  However,	  older	  firms	  are	  not	  necessarily	  more	  likely	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D:	  this	  result	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  our	  analysis	  is	  focusing	  on	  a	  specific	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Cragg-Donald statistics (1993) is used to evaluate the overall strength of the instruments when 
there are multiple endogenous variables. The null hypothesis is that the set of instruments is weak. 
Stock and Yogo (2005) have tabulated the critical values of the minimum eigenvalue of the Cragg-
Donald statistics. To be able to calculate the critical value, it is necessary to identify the rejection rate 
which is tolerable in the context of the analysis. If the test statistic exceeds the critical value then the 
instruments are not weak. 
31 The critical values have been calculated under a rejection rate of 15%.  
32 We have tested the possibility of omitted variables in the selection equation but we find no evidence 
of misspecification. 
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group	  of	  firms,	  i.e.	  multinationals’	  affiliates,	  which	  may	  have	  the	  necessary	  skills	  and	  resources	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  thanks	  to	  the	  parent	  company	  which	  may	  decide	  to	  move	   skilled	  workers	   and	   financial	   resources	   to	   support	   the	   investment	   of	  R&D	   of	   an	   affiliate	   even	   if	   it	   has	   been	   recently	   established.	   Equity	   capital	   is	  positively	   correlated	   to	   the	   propensity	   to	   invest	   in	   R&D	   and	   this	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   literature	  on	   the	  role	  of	  equity	  capital	   in	  supporting	  R&D	   investment.	  Market	   share	   is	   generally	  not	   significant.	  R&D	   intensity	   is	  positively	   related	   to	  firm	  size	  (proxied	  by	  capital	   intensity)	  as	   firms	  that	  use	  more	  capital-­‐intensive	  technologies	   are	   more	   R&D	   intensive	   than	   those	   using	   less	   capital-­‐intensive	  technologies.	  Given	   the	   fact	   that	  R&D	   intensity	   if	  measured	  as	  a	   ratio	  between	  R&D	   expenditure	   and	   fixed	   assets,	   this	   negative	   coefficient	   suggests	   there	   are	  decreasing	   returns	   to	   scale	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   R&D	   investment	   and	  capital	  intensity	  (see	  also	  Crepon	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  Finally,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  network	  of	  affiliates	  is	  positively	  correlated	  with	  the	  R&D	  intensity	  confirming	  the	  view	  that	  larger	  multinationals	  tend	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  routinely.	  	  	  These	   main	   results	   are	   confirmed	   by	   the	   second	   specification.	   In	   the	   third	  specification,	   we	   control	   for	   the	   propensity	   to	   collaborate	   with	   external	  organisations	   and	   this	   variable	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	  R&D	   intensity.	   More	   specifically,	   affiliates	   that	   cooperate	   with	   external	  organizations	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  developing	  an	  innovation	  have	  an	  R&D	  intensity	  which	   is	   much	   higher	   than	   the	   one	   recorded	   for	   affiliates	   which	   do	   not	  collaborate	   with	   other	   organisations.	   We	   also	   control	   for	   the	   propensity	   to	  register	   valuable	   patents	   (proxied	   by	   the	   number	   of	   forward	   citations)	   in	   the	  past	   and	   find	   that	   they	   are	   not	   significant	   suggesting	   that	   the	   “success-­‐breed-­‐success”	  hypothesis	  may	  not	  be	  relevant	  to	  our	  sample.	  R&D	  investment	  taking	  place	  in	  a	  single	  affiliate	  is	  no	  longer	  correlated	  with	  the	  size	  of	  the	  network	  of	  affiliates	   controlled	  by	  a	  multinational	   suggesting	   that	  most	  of	   the	  variation	   in	  R&D	   intensity	   among	   affiliates	   is	   explained	   by	   other	   characteristics	   of	   the	  affiliates.	  
	  Finally,	  in	  the	  last	  specification,	  we	  introduce	  the	  dummy	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	   more	   than	   50%	   of	   the	   shares	   are	   owned	   by	   companies	   from	   Common	   Law	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countries.	  This	  variable	  is	  interacted	  with	  our	  indicator	  of	  corruption	  to	  capture	  the	   fact	   that	   companies	   in	   corrupt	   countries	   may	   benefit	   more	   from	  concentrated	  ownership	  of	  multinationals	   from	  Common	  Law	  countries	   thanks	  to	  the	  quality	  of	   their	  corporate	  governance	  system.	  This	  variable	   is	  significant	  on	   its	   own	   while	   the	   interaction	   term	   is	   not.	   The	   coefficient	   indicates	   that	  affiliates	  whose	  majority	  of	  shares	  is	  controlled	  by	  shareholders	  from	  Common	  Law	   countries	   have	   a	   much	   higher	   R&D	   intensity	   than	   the	   only	   partially	  controlled	   affiliates	   have.	   This	   result	   is	   not	   surprising:	   there	   exists	   a	   lot	   of	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  R&D	  performing	  affiliates	  tend	  to	  be	  fully	  controlled	  by	  their	   parent	   companies	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons	   discussed	   in	   Section	   2	   (see	  Driffield	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   We	   also	   introduce	   in	   the	   R&D	   intensity	   equation	   our	  variables	  of	  interest,	  namely	  the	  indicator	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  board,	  the	  dummy	   of	   perceived	   level	   of	   corruption	   and	   their	   interaction.	   These	   variables	  are	   jointly	   significant	   in	   the	  R&D	   intensity	   equation	   (at	   1%).	   The	   dummy	   that	  controls	   for	   the	   size	  of	   the	  board	   is	  not	   significant	   suggesting	   that	  most	  of	   the	  variation	   in	  R&D	   intensity	   is	  explained	  by	   the	  composition	  of	   the	  board	  rather	  than	  by	  its	  size.	  From	  the	  values	  of	  the	  coefficients,	  it	  appears	  that	  as	  corruption	  decreases	   (i.e.	   the	   control	   of	   corruption	   index	   is	   above	   1.5),	   the	   relationship	  between	  the	  R&D	  intensity	  and	  the	  board	  independence	  changes.	  The	  values	  are	  shown	   in	  Table	  7.	  The	  value	  of	   the	  coefficient	  decreases	  as	  corruption	  reduces	  and	  when	  the	  control	  of	  corruption	  index	  is	  above	  1.5,	  the	  coefficient	  associated	  to	  the	  board	  independence	  index	  becomes	  negative,	  i.e.	  it	  is	  equal	  to	  -­‐2.32.	  	  	  These	   results	   shed	   some	   light	   on	   how	   multinationals	   manage	   the	   board	  structure	  when	   investing	   in	   corrupt	   countries.	   Independent	   boards	   are	   clearly	  valued	   by	   multinationals	   in	   those	   environments	   and	   mostly	   because	   of	   the	  intensity	  of	  their	  monitoring.	  However,	  independent	  boards	  may	  be	  weak	  when	  trying	  to	  advice	  the	  senior	  management.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  multinationals	  try	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	   loss	   in	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   advice	   by	   drawing	  independent	   directors	   from	   the	   pool	   of	   (either	   female	   or	   young	   or	   foreign)	  executives	  in	  the	  same	  industry.	  This	  compensation	  mechanism	  is	  not	  a	  perfect	  substitute	   for	   appointing	   inside	   directors	   who	   may	   have	   a	   more	   complete	  understanding	   of	   how	   the	   company	   operates	   and	   what	   makes	   a	   R&D	   project	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successful.	   Indeed,	   in	   countries	   with	   low	   levels	   of	   corruption,	   the	   benefits	   of	  having	   a	   largely	   independent	   board	   are	   very	   small	   and	   are	   overshadowed	   by	  their	  costs	  which	  are	  associated	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  independent	  directors	  may	  lack	  the	   specific	   knowledge	   of	   the	   company	   to	   be	   able	   to	   advice	   the	   senior	  management	  effectively.	  In	  corrupt	  countries,	  however,	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  an	  independent	   board	   more	   than	   compensate	   the	   costs	   of	   having	   independent	  directors.	  	  
	  
Stage	   2.	   	   We	   consider	   next	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   two	   innovation	   equations	  discussed	  in	  Stage	  2.	  The	  Maximum	  Likelihood	  estimates	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  8	  with	   the	   first	  column	  reporting	   the	  model	  where	   the	  dependent	  variable	   is	   the	  patent	   counts	   by	   year	   while	   the	   second	   column	   reports	   the	   model	   where	   the	  number	   of	   forward	   citations	   is	   our	   dependent	   variables.	   The	   over-­‐dispersion	  coefficient	   (α)	   is	   significant	   supporting	   the	   choice	   of	   the	   Negative	   Binomial	  model.	  We	  used	  two	  specifications:	  the	  first	  one	  attempts	  to	  control	  for	  the	  past	  patenting/citations	  activities	  of	  the	  company	  (through	  a	  set	  of	  dummies)	  while	  a	  second	  one	  does	  not	  include	  these	  variables.	  As	  the	  variables	  are	  not	  significant	  and	   the	   estimates	   do	   not	   differ	   significantly,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   second	   set	   of	  estimates.	  	  As	  expected,	   the	  R&D	   intensity	  variable,	   taken	  at	   its	  predicted	  values	   from	  the	  last	   specification	   of	   the	   Heckman	   model,	   is	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	  probability	  of	  registering	  a	  patent33.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  this	  coefficient	  indicates	  a	  robust	   result	   throughout	   each	   of	   the	   specifications.	   In	   the	   literature	   on	  knowledge	   innovation	   functions,	   coefficients	   in	   the	   range	   of	   0.4	   and	   1.1	   are	  typically	   found.	   Our	   estimate	   of	   coefficients	   of	   the	   R&D	   variable	   is	   below	   this	  range	  but	  still	  close	  to	  the	  lower	  bound.	  The	  R&D	  intensity	  affects	  positively	  the	  forward	   citations	   counts	   as	  we	  would	   expect	   although	   the	   coefficient	   is	  much	  smaller.	   Firm’s	   size	   is	   positively	   correlated	   with	   the	   innovation	   output	   -­‐	  conditional	   on	   innovation	   input	   (R&D)	   -­‐	   as	   large	   firms	   tend	   to	   register	   more	  patents	   than	   small	   innovative	   firms.	   Age	   is	   significant	   in	   the	   patent	   counts	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 We have tested whether our governance variables could contribute to explain the variation in the 
counts of the patents and citations while controlling for the predicted R&D but these variables have 
turned out to be insignificant while the predicted R&D intensity still was. 
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equation	   only	   suggesting	   that	   while	   old	   firms	   may	   invest	   more	   in	   R&D	   and	  register	  more	  patents,	   they	  may	  not	  have	  more	  valuable	  patents.	  This	   result	   is	  rather	  standard	  in	  the	  innovation	  literature	  and	  it	  is	  usually	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  older	  firms	  may	  carry	  out	  some	  routine	  R&D	  which	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  linked	  to	  the	  actual	  production	  of	  a	  valuable	   innovation.	  Capital	   intensity	  has	  a	  positive	  sign	  and	  it	  is	  significant	  in	  both	  equations	  suggesting	  that	  more	  capital-­‐intensive	  firms	  tend	  to	  have	  more	  valuable	  patents.	  	  
	  
4.1	  Robustness	  tests	  
	  In	   this	   section,	   we	   present	   the	   results	   of	   a	   set	   of	   additional	   tests	   that	   aim	   at	  gauging	   the	  robustness	  of	   the	  main	  results	   from	  the	  previous	  section.	  We	  only	  present	   the	   results	   relative	   to	   the	   main	   variables	   of	   interest	   from	   the	   R&D	  investment	  equations	  for	  brevity	  unless	  indicated	  otherwise.	  	  	  	  	  
4.1.1.	  Demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  directors	  While	   a	   large	   literature	   in	   corporate	   governance	   has	   focused	   on	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   board	   and	   its	   relationship	   with	   the	   performance	   of	   the	  company,	   an	   even	   larger	   literature	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   demographic	  characteristics	   of	   the	   directors	   (Johnson	   et	   al,	   2013).	   In	   particular	   age	   has	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  attention.	  Age	  is	  usually	  considered	  a	  proxy	  for	  experience	  with	  the	   result	   that	   a	   positive	   relationship	   with	   the	   firm-­‐level	   performance	   is	  expected.	   	   However,	   some	   authors	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	   age	   may	   also	   be	   an	  indicator	  of	  risk	  aversion	  (Platt	  and	  Platt,	  2012)	  and	  this	  may	  be	  quite	  relevant	  to	  our	  case	  as	  investing	  in	  R&D	  can	  be	  a	  risky	  pursuit	  with	  uncertain	  outcomes.	  In	   other	   words,	   we	   could	   expect	   that	   younger	   (and	   possibly	   inexperienced)	  directors	  may	  end	  up	  approving	  R&D	  projects	   that	   are	   risky	  and	  probably	  not	  very	  productive.	  	  	  Given	   the	   literature,	   we	   have	   tested	   whether	   companies	   whose	   directors	   are	  below	   fifty	   years	   old	   tend	   to	   invest	   more	   in	   R&D.	   To	   this	   purpose,	   we	   have	  constructed	  a	  dummy	  variable	  taking	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	  average	  age	  of	  directors	  on	   the	   board	   is	   below	   fifty	   years	   old.	  We	   have	   introduced	   this	   variable	   in	   the	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R&D	  investment	  equations	  and	  the	  results	  are	  shown	  in	  the	  first	  column	  of	  Table	  9.	   The	   dummy	   variable	   is	   not	   significant	   suggesting	   that	   companies	   with	  directors	  whose	  average	  age	  is	  less	  than	  fifty	  may	  not	  necessarily	  invest	  more	  in	  R&D.	  	  	  
4.1.2	  Foreign	  connections	  of	  the	  directors	  
	  There	   exists	   a	   large	   literature	   that	   examines	   how	   the	   directors’	   social	  relationships	   (both	   personal	   and	   business	   relationships)	  may	   affect	   the	   board	  dynamics	   and	   eventually	   the	   firm’s	   performance	   (Johnson	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   It	   has	  been	  argued	  that	  social	  relationships	  may	  affect	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  directors	  to	  monitor	  the	  management	  and	  may	  eventually	  compromise	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  (see	  for	  instance,	  Ruigrok	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  multinationals,	  a	  “desirable”	  board	  for	  subsidiaries	  operating	  in	  corrupt	  countries	  may	  not	  be	  an	  independent	   board	   per	   se	   but	   rather	   a	   board	  made	   of	   directors	   who	   have	   no	  connections	  with	  the	  local	  environment	  as	  they	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  corruptible	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  closely	  monitor	  the	  local	  management.	  To	  test	  whether	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  we	  have	  computed	  for	  each	  board	  the	  proportion	  of	  directors	  who	  have	  ties	   only	   with	   foreign	   firms	   (but	   not	   with	   local	   firms)	   and	   created	   a	   variable	  taking	   the	   value	   of	   one	   if	   more	   than	   fifty	   percent	   of	   the	   directors	   have	   only	  connections	   with	   foreign	   firms.	   We	   have	   introduced	   this	   variable	   among	   the	  regressors	   in	   the	   R&D	   investment	   equations	   and	   the	   results	   (shown	   in	   the	  second	  column	  of	  Table	  9	  –	  Column	  2)	  suggest	  that	  the	  variable	  is	  not	  significant	  while	   the	   main	   results	   still	   hold.	   In	   other	   words,	   independence	   of	   the	   board	  (defined	  in	  the	  usual	  way)	  still	  matters	  for	  well-­‐performing	  affiliates.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
4.1.3	  The	  Institutional	  Environment	  	  How	   robust	   are	   our	   results	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   indicators	   of	   the	   quality	   of	  institutions	   in	   the	   outcome	   equation?	   A	   large	   literature	   on	   public	   governance	  suggests	   that	   corruption	   is	   really	   the	   expression	   of	   dysfunctional	   institutions	  hinting	  at	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  main	  result	  may	  not	  hold	  any	  longer	  once	  we	  control	  for	  government	  effectiveness.	  In	  our	  context,	  government	  effectiveness	  is	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defined	  as	  in	  Hellman	  et	  al.	  (2000)	  and	  captures	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  services	  and	  of	  the	  civil	  service	  as	  well	  as	  its	  independence	  from	  political	  pressure.	  Therefore,	  we	  add	  to	  our	  R&D	  investment	  equations	   the	  World	  Bank	  indicators	  of	   government	  effectiveness	   (presented	   in	   the	  descriptive	   statistics)	  to	  test	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  main	  results.	  The	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  9	  (Column	  3)	  and	  they	  show	  that	  the	  indicator	  of	  government	  effectiveness	  is	  not	  significant	  while	  the	  main	  variables	  of	  interest	  are	  still	  jointly	  significant.	  	  
4.1.6	  Other	  Institutional	  Variables	  	  In	   the	   section	   on	   descriptive	   statistics,	   we	   have	   discussed	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   percentage	   of	   independent	   directors	   in	   a	   board	   and	   some	  characteristics	   of	   the	   institutional	   environment	   (Legal	   Origin	   index	   –	   LLSV	   -­‐	   ,	  revised	  anti-­‐director	  index	  and	  Law	  and	  Order	  index)	  of	  the	  host	  country.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  test	  whether	  the	  same	  indicators	  mediate	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  relative	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  and	  the	  affiliates’	  R&D	  intensity.	  Indeed	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  as	  corruption	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  dysfunctional	  institutions,	  then	  structural	   indicators	  of	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  the	  local	   institutions	  can	  better	   capture	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   R&D	   intensity	   and	  structure	   of	   the	   board.	   We	   have	   therefore	   interacted	   our	   measure	   of	   board	  independence	   with	   each	   of	   the	   three	   institutional	   indicators	   reported	   above	  while	  controlling	  for	  the	  ownership	  structure	  (in	  turn	  interacted	  with	  each	  of	  the	  three	  indicators	  as	  well).	  The	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  10	  (Column	  1	  for	  the	  LLSV	   index,	  Column	  2	   for	   the	  revised	  anti-­‐director	   index	  and	  Column	  3	   for	   the	  Law	  and	  Order	  index)	  and	  in	  each	  case	  the	  variables	  both	  in	  level	  and	  interacted	  are	   not	   significant	   suggesting	   that	   the	   variation	   of	   the	   R&D	   intensity	   across	  countries	   and	   over	   time	   cannot	   be	   simply	   explained	   by	   the	   structural	  characteristics	  of	  the	  local	  institutions.	  	  	  	  
5.	  CONCLUDING	  REMARKS	  	  This	  paper	  has	  analysed	  the	  relationship	  among	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  board	  of	   directors,	   country-­‐level	   corruption	   and	   innovation	   in	   4,100	   manufacturing	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subsidiaries	  belonging	  to	  British	  multinationals	  and	  located	  in	  30	  countries.	  The	  sample	   period	   is	   between	   2005	   and	   2013.	   Although	   there	   is	   a	   voluminous	  literature	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  corporate	  performance,	  characteristics	  of	  the	  board	  and	  the	  legal	  environment,	  so	  far	  no	  study	  has	  analysed	  how	  effective	  independent	  boards	  are	  in	  corrupt	  environments	  in	  insulating	  a	  company	  from	  corruption.	   To	   model	   the	   relationship	   between	   corruption,	   innovation	   and	  independence	   of	   the	   board,	   we	   have	   estimated	   an	   innovation	   production	  function	  that	  links	  innovation	  outputs	  to	  innovation	  input	  (namely	  investment	  in	  R&D)	   after	   controlling	   for	   the	   subsidiary’s	   characteristics	   and	   the	   levels	   of	  perceived	   corruption	   in	   the	   host	   country.	   The	   results	   show	   that	   subsidiaries	  located	  in	  more	  corrupt	  countries	  with	  more	  independent	  boards	  tend	  to	  invest	  more	   in	   R&D	   and	   register	  more	   valuable	   patents.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  notice	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  an	  independent	  board	  decrease	  as	  corruption	  reduces:	  this	  result	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  independent	  directors	  may	  lack	  the	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  the	  company’s	  operations	  which	  may	  be	  detrimental	  to	  the	  company.	  	  	  This	   paper	   contributes	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   in	   this	   area	   in	   several	   ways.	  	  First,	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  independent	  directors	  who	  can	  monitor	  the	  local	  management	  can	   limit	   the	   inefficiencies	  associated	  with	  operating	   in	  a	  corrupt	  country.	  Importantly,	  the	  paper	  shows	  that	  other	  ways	  of	  structuring	  the	  board	  of	  directors	  may	  not	  be	  as	  effective	  as	  independence	  in	  insulating	  affiliates	  from	  the	  negative	  impact	  of	  corruption.	  Indeed,	  this	  result	  still	  holds	  when	  we	  control	  for	  the	  age	  of	  the	  directors	  which	  indicates	  that	  more	  experienced	  directors	  may	  not	   make	   irrelevant	   the	   role	   that	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   board	   can	   play	   in	  protecting	  the	  company	  from	  corruption.	  The	  same	  applies	  when	  controlling	  for	  the	  proportion	  of	  directors	  who	  have	  no	  connections	  with	   local	   firms	   implying	  that	   the	   lack	  of	   understanding	  of	   the	   local	   context	  may	  not	  help	   the	   company.	  Second,	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  operating	  environment	  of	  a	  company	  may	  be	  a	  strong	  conditioning	   factor	  when	  owners	  decide	  on	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  board.	   Indeed,	  our	   results	   show	   that	   R&D	   performing	   firms	   that	   theoretically	   should	   benefit	  from	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   advice	   of	   a	   less	   independent	   board	   still	   prefer	  independent	   boards	   when	   investing	   in	   corrupt	   countries.	   Finally,	   the	   results	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shed	   some	   light	   on	   how	   multinationals	   manage	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   the	  advising	   function	   and	   the	  monitoring	   function	   in	   corrupt	   countries.	   Indeed,	   in	  corrupt	   countries,	   multinationals	   prioritise	   the	   monitoring	   function	   to	   the	  advising	  function	  and	  prefer	  to	  have	  independent	  boards	  to	  guarantee	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  monitoring	  intensity.	  This	  strategy	  comes	  with	  a	  loss	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  advice	   from	   the	   board	   but	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   pays	   off	   as	   affiliates	  with	  more	  independent	   boards	   tend	   to	   be	  more	   R&D	   intensive	   and	   innovative.	   However,	  this	   strategy	   is	   not	   useful	   to	   multinationals	   that	   invest	   in	   countries	   with	   low	  levels	   of	   perceived	   corruption.	   In	   these	   cases,	   the	   costs	   associated	   to	   the	   low	  quality	  of	  the	  advice	  from	  the	  board	  overshadow	  the	  benefits	  of	  having	  a	  board	  mostly	   composed	   by	   outside	   directors	   with	   limited	   understanding	   of	   the	  company’s	  operations.	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Table	  1.	  Basic	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
Country	   Equity	   Workers	  
R&D	  






corruption	   Age	  
Ownership	  
(1/0)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Austria	   5.951	   133	   0.199	   1	   3	   0.1	   1.723	   25	   0.367	  
	   2.107	   146.152	   0.300	   5.4	   16.4	   0.7	   0.259	   28.490	   0.483	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Belgium	   7.534	   293	   0.250	   11	   34	   2	   1.438	   26	   0.379	  
	   3.083	   997.005	   0.327	   63.5	   264.6	   13.3	   0.128	   22.720	   0.486	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	   7.061	   70	   0.001	   0.1	   0	   0	   -­‐0.319	   6	   0.125	  
	   0.831	   10.162	   0.002	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.052	   2.449	   0.354	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Bulgaria	   8.240	   517	   0.064	   0.2	   0	   0	   -­‐0.208	   8	   0.667	  
	   2.826	   358.373	   0.139	   0.3	   0.4	   0.0	   0.101	   5.140	   0.482	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Croatia	   4.663	   52	   0.045	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.008	   17	   0.419	  
	   3.388	   19.748	   0.072	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.076	   18.265	   0.502	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Czech	  Republic	   6.679	   318	   0.084	   0.2	   0.4	   0	   0.286	   11	   0.439	  
	   3.042	   614.905	   0.180	   1.6	   2.8	   0.3	   0.070	   5.286	   0.497	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Denmark	   6.636	   126	   0.351	   2	   7	   0.7	   2.425	   33	   0.319	  
	   2.242	   130.386	   0.375	   6.8	   29.9	   1.8	   0.037	   31.226	   0.470	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Estonia	   3.084	   59	   0.107	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.929	   16	   0.500	  
	   1.780	   54.673	   0.177	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.072	   3.033	   0.513	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Finland	   6.835	   97	   0.358	   2	   3	   0.5	   2.314	   25	   0.575	  
	   2.074	   120.666	   0.336	   4.7	   9.8	   1.9	   0.125	   19.264	   0.496	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
France	   7.283	   207	   0.250	   0.3	   0.5	   0	   1.415	   26	   0.481	  
	   2.367	   445.885	   0.324	   1.1	   3.0	   0.4	   0.060	   16.342	   0.500	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Germany	   5.885	   269	   0.177	   3	   13	   0.7	   1.752	   23	   0.388	  
	   2.445	   842.057	   0.272	   18.3	   85.8	   6.0	   0.044	   20.227	   0.487	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Greece	   7.680	   140	   0.104	   0.2	   0.1	   0	   0.046	   24	   0.524	  
	   1.459	   86.890	   0.181	   0.1	   1.0	   0.0	   0.236	   15.925	   0.503	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Hungary	   7.795	   266	   0.072	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.405	   13	   0.198	  
	   2.202	   230.469	   0.117	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.139	   5.404	   0.399	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ireland	   6.610	   58	   0.475	   0.2	   0.6	   0.1	   1.622	   19	   0.375	  
	   1.991	   57.771	   0.415	   1.1	   3.1	   0.5	   0.118	   21.174	   0.486	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Italy	   6.427	   178	   0.270	   0.3	   0.8	   0.1	   0.166	   21	   0.380	  
	   2.533	   364.887	   0.319	   1.7	   7.6	   0.9	   0.176	   16.603	   0.486	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Latvia	   6.384	   78	   0.084	   0.2	   0	   0	   0.188	   12	   0.000	  
	   1.660	   21.069	   0.095	   0.3	   0.0	   0.0	   0.061	   6.827	   0.000	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Lithuania	   5.173	   135	   0.012	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.143	   5	   0.571	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   3.821	   60.926	   0.016	   0.2	   0.0	   0.0	   0.123	   2.056	   0.514	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Luxembourg	   9.216	   148	   0.035	   0.4	   5.9	   0.3	   2.035	   39	   0.385	  
	   2.173	   100.577	   0.048	   2.2	   30.2	   1.8	   0.134	   25.859	   0.496	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Malta	   2.887	   167	   0.334	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.941	   8	   0.300	  
	   1.686	   268.173	   0.376	   0.3	   0.0	   0.0	   0.093	   13.153	   0.483	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Netherlands	   5.109	   166	   0.318	   0.5	   0.8	   0.1	   2.125	   25	   0.599	  
	   2.869	   221.943	   0.367	   2.7	   4.6	   0.5	   0.069	   23.904	   0.491	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Norway	   6.257	   75	   0.359	   0.4	   0.4	   0.1	   2.090	   15	   0.502	  
	   2.368	   104.110	   0.301	   1.8	   2.8	   0.5	   0.131	   6.495	   0.501	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Poland	   7.247	   304	   0.064	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.379	   17	   0.441	  
	   2.512	   491.429	   0.153	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.141	   17.511	   0.497	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Portugal	   7.022	   114	   0.269	   0.3	   0	   0	   1.000	   25	   0.276	  
	   1.848	   114.480	   0.343	   0.2	   0.0	   0.0	   0.054	   19.917	   0.449	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Romania	   6.777	   615	   0.033	   0.1	   0.1	   0	   -­‐0.204	   9	   0.352	  
	   2.855	   1266.438	   0.056	   0.2	   0.9	   0.0	   0.040	   4.995	   0.479	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Russian	  Federation	   6.595	   783	   0.113	   0.1	   0	   0	   -­‐1.001	   32	   0.621	  
	   2.210	   974.973	   0.202	   0.3	   0.0	   0.0	   0.088	   54.881	   0.489	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Serbia	   8.259	   121	   0.107	   0.1	   0	   0	   -­‐0.303	   8	   0.500	  
	   1.262	   89.556	   0.183	   0.2	   0.0	   0.0	   0.034	   4.238	   0.508	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Slovakia	   8.354	   505	   0.070	   0.1	   0	   0	   0.259	   11	   0.309	  
	   2.659	   746.656	   0.158	   0.2	   0.0	   0.0	   0.127	   5.135	   0.465	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Slovenia	   5.845	   86	   0.238	   0.5	   1.4	   0.8	   0.909	   11	   0.420	  
	   1.978	   118.313	   0.274	   1.7	   5.2	   2.7	   0.088	   6.364	   0.499	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Spain	   6.730	   230	   0.208	   0.1	   0.2	   0	   1.049	   25	   0.342	  
	   2.441	   478.811	   0.278	   0.8	   1.9	   0.4	   0.120	   20.030	   0.475	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Sweden	   5.355	   516	   0.360	   92	   186	   25	   2.243	   31	   0.660	  
	   2.839	   1573.063	   0.380	   482.4	   925.8	   145.2	   0.083	   28.428	   0.475	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Ukraine	   6.915	   328	   0.044	   0.1	   0	   0	   -­‐0.919	   11	   0.571	  
	   1.754	   279.991	   0.068	   0.1	   0.0	   0.0	   0.152	   4.844	   0.500	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	   6.583	   256	   0.212	   5	   11	   1	   1.145	   22	   0.423	  	   2.609	   689.824	   0.301	   90.1	   184.1	   26.9	   0.791	   19.846	   0.494	  Source:	   Amadeus	   and	  World	   Patents	  Databases.	   Authors’	   calculations.	  Mean	   is	  reported	   on	   the	   first	   row	  while	   the	   standard	   deviation	   is	   reported	   below	   the	  mean.	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Table	  2.	  Matrix	  of	  Correlations	  	  
	  
	   	  
	   Equity	   Workers	   R&D	  intensity	   Patents	   	  Forward	  citations	   External	  collaborators	   Control	  of	  corruption	   Age	   Ownership	  (1/0)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Equity	   	  	  	  	  	  1.00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Workers	   0.33	   1.00	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
R&D	  intensity	   -­‐0.14	   -­‐0.09	   1.00	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Patents	   0.11	   0.50	   -­‐0.02	   1.00	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  Forward	  
citations	   0.13	   0.52	   -­‐0.02	   0.87	   1.00	   	   	   	   	  
External	  
collaborators	   0.09	   0.39	   -­‐0.02	   0.71	   0.89	   1.00	   	   	   	  
Control	  of	  
corruption	   -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.03	   0.16	   0.07	   0.07	   0.06	   1.00	   	   	  
Age	   0.24	   0.15	   -­‐0.11	   0.14	   0.14	   0.13	   0.19	   1.00	   	  
Ownership	  (1/0)	   -­‐0.06	   -­‐0.01	   0.01	   0.04	   0.04	   0.04	   0.05	   0.03	   1.00	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Figure	  3.	  	  Percentage	  of	  shares	  owned	  by	  UK	  parent	  companies,	  by	  country.	  

























































































































































































Table	  3.	  Legal	  tradition	  of	  countries	  included	  in	  the	  sample.	  
	  
Legal Tradition Countries 
Common Law countries Ireland (62), Malta (53). 
Civil Law countries Belgium (62), France (45), Greece (27), Italy 
(51), Luxembourg (93), 
Netherlands (54), Portugal (65), Spain (21). 
 
Scandinavian Law countries Denmark (51), Finland (61), Norway (67), 
Sweden (55). 


















Table	  4.	  Revised	  Anti-­‐Director	  Rights	  Index	  	  
	  
Revised anti-director rights index Countries 
2 Greece (27), Hungary (37), Italy (51), 
Luxembourg (93), Poland (51). 
2.5 Austria (57), Croatia (80), Netherlands (54), 
Portugal (65). 
3 Belgium (62), Bulgaria (90), Slovakia (83), 
Ukraine (50). 
3.5 Finland (61), France (45), Germany (52), Norway 
(67), Sweden (55). 
4 Czech Republic (60), Denmark (51), Latvia (28), 
Lithuania (25).  
5 Ireland (62), Romania (42), Spain (21). Note:	  The	  table	  classifies	  the	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  according	  to	  the	  values	  of	  the	  revised	  Anti-­‐Director	  Rights	  index	  calculated	  by	  Djankov	  et	  al.	  (2008).	  The	  index	  summarises	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  legislation	  protects	  the	  minority	  shareholders	  in	  the	  corporate	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Larger	  values	  of	  the	  index	  are	  associated	  to	  countries	  whose	  legislation	  is	  more	  favourable	  to	  minority	  shareholders.	  The	  country/time	  average	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  outside	  directors	  among	  foreign	  affiliates	  in	  the	  sample	  is	  in	  parentheses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  5.	  ICRG	  Law	  and	  Order	  Index	  	  
	  
Law and Order Index Countries 
3 Bulgaria (90) 
4 Romania (42), Estonia (55), Hungary (37), Italy 
(51), Slovakia (83), Ukraine (50). 
4.5 Poland (51), Greece (27), Slovenia (75), Croatia 
(80). 
5 Belgium (62), Czech Republic (60), France (45), 
Germany (52), Latvia (28), Malta (53), Portugal 
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(65), Spain (21). 
6 Austria (57), Denmark (51), Finland (61), Ireland 
(62), Luxembourg (93), Netherlands (54), 
Norway (67), Sweden (55). Note:	  The	  table	  classifies	  the	  countries	  in	  our	  sample	  according	  to	  the	  values	  of	  the	  ICRG	  Law	  and	  Order	  Index.	  The	  index	  summarises	  the	  extent	  to	  the	  legal	  system	  is	  impartial	  and	  law	  is	  generally	  observed	  within	  the	  country.	  Larger	  values	  of	  the	  index	  are	  associated	  to	  less	  risky	  countries.	  	  The	  country/time	  average	  of	  the	  board	  independence	  indicator	  is	  in	  parentheses.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Figure	  5.	  Board	  Independence	  index	  vs	  LLSV	  index	  
	  	  
	  Note:	  1	  refers	  to	  the	  Common	  Law	  countries,	  2	  refers	  to	  the	  countries	  from	  the	  Civil	  Law	  tradition,	  3	  refers	  to	  countries	  from	  the	  Germanic	  legal	  tradition	  while	  4	  refers	  to	  the	  countries	  from	  the	  Scandinavian	  legal	  tradition.	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Figure	  6.	  Board	  Independence	  index	  (i.e.	  percentage	  of	  outside	  directors)	  vs.	  the	  
Revised	  Anti-­‐director	  index	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Figure	  7.	  Board	  Independence	  index	  (i.e.	  percentage	  of	  outside	  directors)	  vs	  the	  





























Table	  6.	  Stage	  1:	  R&D	  investment	  –	  Heckman	  model	  	  
R&D	  intensity	  (log)	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	  





Number	  of	  subsidiaries	   0.060	   0.047	   -­‐0.033	  
	   (3.18)	   (2.13)	   (-­‐1.27)	  
Age	  (log)	   -­‐0.62	   -­‐0.64	   -­‐0.43	  
	   (-­‐5.75)	   (-­‐5.48)	   (-­‐6.30)	  
Fixed	  Assets	  intensity	  (log)	   -­‐0.70	   -­‐0.71	   -­‐0.66	  
	   (-­‐3.79)	   (-­‐3.72)	   (-­‐2.68)	  
Size	  of	  the	  board	  (1/0)	   	   0.17	   -­‐0.147	  
	   	   (1.31)	   (-­‐0.64)	  
Market	  Share	   -­‐0.0088	   -­‐0.0086	   0.013	  
	   (-­‐0.51)	   (-­‐0.52)	   (1.23)	  
Collaborating	  with	  an	  external	  organisation	  (1/0)	   	   	   0.79	  
	   	   	   (2.46)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐1	   	   0.40	   -­‐0.032	  
	   	   (1.22)	   (-­‐0.07)	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Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐2	   	   0.76	   0.13	  
	   	   (2.77)	   (0.31)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐3	   	   1.08	   0.56	  
	   	   (4.93)	   (1.20)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐4	   	   1.047	   0.64	  
	   	   (4.50)	   (1.27)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐5	   	   0.29	   0.37	  
	   	   (1.12)	   (0.69)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐6	   	   0.044	   0.12	  
	   	   (0.15)	   (0.23)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐7	   	   0.84	   0.80	  
	   	   (3.66)	   (1.45)	  
Forward	  citations	  (1/0)	  -­‐	  t-­‐8	   	   1.065	   0.92	  
	   	   (2.42)	   (1.46)	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)	   	   	   0.35	  
	   	   	   (2.58)	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)*Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	   	   	   -­‐0.30	  
	   	   	   (-­‐1.18)	  
Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	   	   	   3.74	  
	   	   	   (2.68)	  
Share	  of	  Independent	  Directors	   	   	   1.59	  
	   	   	   (2.53)	  
Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	  *	  Share	  of	  Independent	  
Directors	   	   	   -­‐3.91	  
	   	   	   (-­‐2.82)	  
Constant	   -­‐6.83	   -­‐6.83	   -­‐7.83	  	   (-­‐11.13)	   (-­‐11.13)	   (-­‐7.82)	  
Propensity	  to	  invest	  in	  R&D	  (1/0)	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  
Fixed	  Assets	  (log)	   0.090	   0.090	   0.090	  
	   (2.57)	   (2.57)	   (2.57)	  
Equity	  (log)	   0.024	   0.024	   0.024	  
	   (5.81)	   (5.81)	   (5.81)	  
Workers	  (log)	   0.37	   0.37	   0.37	  
	   (46.88)	   (46.88)	   (46.88)	  
Age	  (log)	   -­‐0.22	   -­‐0.22	   -­‐0.22	  
	   (-­‐13.16)	   (-­‐13.16)	   (-­‐13.16)	  
Market	  Share	   -­‐0.0017	   -­‐0.0017	   -­‐0.0017	  
	   (-­‐0.33)	   (-­‐0.33)	   (-­‐0.33)	  
Constant	  	   -­‐1.44	   -­‐1.44	   -­‐1.44	  	   (-­‐20.30)	   (-­‐20.30)	   (-­‐20.30)	  
p-­‐value	   0.0001	   0.0003	   0.0001	  
Cragg-­‐Donald	  test	  	   	   	   5.42	  
Test	  of	  Overidentifying	  Restrictions	  (p-­‐value)	   	   	   0.10	  
	   	   	   	  
N	   23287	   23287	   23287	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Table	  7.	  Coefficient	  of	  the	  board	  independence	  index	  	  
 Coefficient associated to the 
board independence index 
Control of corruption is larger 
than 1.5 
-2.32 
Control of corruption is less 
than 1.5 





















Table	  8.	  Stage	  2:	  Patents	  and	  Citations	  Counts	  –	  Negative	  Binomial	  regression	  	  








Capital	  Intensity	  (log)	   3.79	   2.47	  
	   (1.63)	   (1.67)	  
Workers(log)	   1.22	   1.23	  
	   (8.01)	   (12.39)	  
Age(log)	   0.13	   -­‐0.19	  
	   (0.83)	   (-­‐0.68)	  
Predicted	  R&D	  Intensity	   0.30	   0.22	  
	   (3.09)	   (3.26)	  
	  
Constant	   4.02	   -­‐1.74	  










R&D	  intensity	  (log)	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	  





Age	  of	  directors	  above	  50	  (1/0)	   -­‐0.0052	   	   	  
	   (-­‐0.46)	   	   	  
Foreign	  Connections	  (1/0)	   	   0.12	   	  
	   	   (0.87)	   	  
Government	  Effectiveness	   	   	   0.006	  
	   	   	   (0.01)	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)	   0.33	   0.31	   0.33	  
	   (2.46)	   (2.46)	   (2.44)	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)*	  Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	   -­‐0.15	   	  	  	  	  -­‐0.14	   -­‐0.155	  
	   (-­‐0.66)	   (0.63)	   (-­‐0.67)	  
Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	   3.095	   3.03	   3.12	  
	   (2.23)	   (2.27)	   (2.30)	  
Share	  of	  Independent	  Directors	   1.48	   1.42	   1.48	  
	   (2.18)	   (2.26)	   (2.16)	  
Control	  of	  Corruption	  (1/0)	  *	  Share	  of	  Independent	  
Directors	   -­‐3.18	   -­‐3.14	   -­‐3.22	  
	   (-­‐2.33)	   (-­‐2.38)	   (-­‐2.41)	  
Constant	   -­‐7.79	   -­‐7.93	   -­‐7.84	  	   (-­‐7.54)	   (-­‐7.76)	   (-­‐7.70)	  
p-­‐value	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	  
Cragg-­‐Donald	  test	  	   5.36	   5.92	   5.43	  
Test	  on	  Overidentifying	  Restrictions	  (p-­‐value)	   0.104	   0.109	   0.10	  	   	   	   	  	  	  Note:	   Panel	   A	   shows	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   outcome	   equation	   (R&D	   intensity	  equation).	  Model	  1	  models	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  age	  of	  the	  directors	  and	  the	   investment	   in	   R&D	   while	   Model	   2	   refers	   to	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	  proportion	  of	  directors	  with	  foreign	  only	  connections	  and	  the	  R&D	  investment.	  Model	   3	   control	   for	   the	   government	   effectiveness.	   Two-­‐step	   estimates	  with	   t-­‐ratios	   in	  parentheses.	  Bootstrapped	   standard	  errors	   clustered	  around	   the	  host	  country.	   The	   period	   of	   analysis	   is	   2005-­‐2013.	   Year,	   country	   and	   industry	  dummies	   are	   included	   in	   all	   specifications.	   The	   p-­‐value	   is	   the	   result	   of	  significance	  test	  of	  the	  Inverse	  Mills	  Ratio	  (IMR).	  All	  models	  have	  been	  estimated	  using	  an	  IV	  estimator	  with	  the	  IMR	  used	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  sample	  selection.	  The	  instruments	   include:	   a)	   the	   average	   proportion	   of	   foreign	   executives	   with	   no	  local	  business	  connections	  that	  work	  for	  other	  multinationals	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	  industry,	  country	  and	  year,	  b)	   the	  density	  of	  multinationals	   in	   the	  same	  region	  (NUTS2),	  country	  and	  year	  and	  c)	  the	  proportion	  of	  female	  executives	  below	  50	  years	   old	   who	   work	   for	   other	   multinationals	   in	   the	   same	   3-­‐digit	   industry,	  country	   and	   year.	   The	   test	   on	   overidentifying	   restrictions	   is	   the	   Sargan	   test	  while	   the	   Cragg-­‐Donald	   test	   is	   significant	   at	   5%	   (with	   the	   critical	   value	  calculated	  for	  a	  rejection	  rate	  of	  15%).	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Table	  10.	  Robustness	  tests	  –	  Other	  institutional	  variables	  
R&D	  intensity	  (log)	   Model	  1	   Model	  2	   Model	  3	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Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)	   -­‐0.48	   1.42	   5.22	  
	   (-­‐0.41)	   (1.63)	   (0.85)	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)*	  LLSV	   0.76	   	   	  
	   (0.64)	   	   	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)*	  Revised	  Anti-­‐director	  index	   	   -­‐0.41	   	  
	   	   (-­‐1.42)	   	  
Majority	   Owners	   from	   Common	   Law	   countries	  
(1/0)*	  Law	  and	  Order	  index	   	   	   -­‐1.12	  
	   	   	   (-­‐0.82)	  
LLSV	   -­‐10.36	   	   	  
	   (-­‐1.06)	   	   	  
Revised	  Anti-­‐director	  index	   	   8.85	   	  
	   	   (5.96)	   	  
Law	  and	  Order	  index	   	   	   17.92	  
	   	   	   (0.65)	  
Share	  of	  Independent	  Directors	   -­‐12.01	   4.13	   92.23	  
	   (-­‐1.18)	   (0.92)	   (0.67)	  
LLSV	  *	  Share	  of	  Independent	  Directors	   12.38	   	   	  
	   (1.18)	   	   	  
Revised	  Anti-­‐director	  index	  *	  Share	  of	  Independent	  
Directors	   	   -­‐1.08	   	  
	   	   (-­‐0.93)	   	  
Law	   and	   Order	   index	   *	   Share	   of	   Independent	  
Directors	   	   	   -­‐18.83	  
	   	   	   (-­‐0.67)	  
Constant	   9.76	   13.23	   -­‐94.57	  
	   (0.93)	   (2.05)	   (-­‐0.67)	  	  Note:	   Panel	   A	   shows	   the	   estimates	   of	   the	   outcome	   equation	   (R&D	   intensity	  equation).	  In	  Model	  1,	  the	  relationship	  between	  LLSV	  and	  the	  investment	  in	  R&D	  is	   estimated	   while	   in	   Model	   2	   we	   estimate	   the	   relationship	   between	   Revised	  Anti-­‐director	   index	   and	   the	   R&D	   intensity.	   In	   Model	   3	   we	   estimate	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   Law	   and	   Order	   index	   and	   R&D	   intensity.	   Two-­‐step	  estimates	  with	   t-­‐ratios	   in	  parentheses.	  Bootstrapped	  standard	  errors	  clustered	  around	  the	  host	  country.	  The	  period	  of	  analysis	  is	  2005-­‐2013.	  Year,	  country	  and	  industry	  dummies	  are	  included	  in	  all	  specifications.	  The	  p-­‐value	  is	  the	  result	  of	  significance	  test	  of	  the	  Inverse	  Mills	  Ratio	  (IMR).	  All	  models	  have	  been	  estimated	  using	  an	  IV	  estimator	  with	  the	  IMR	  used	  to	  correct	  for	  the	  sample	  selection.	  The	  instruments	   include:	   a)	   the	   average	   proportion	   of	   foreign	   executives	   with	   no	  local	  business	  connections	  that	  work	  for	  other	  multinationals	  in	  the	  same	  3-­‐digit	  industry,	  country	  and	  year,	  b)	   the	  density	  of	  multinationals	   in	   the	  same	  region	  (NUTS2),	  country	  and	  year	  and	  c)	  the	  proportion	  of	  female	  executives	  below	  50	  years	   old	   who	   work	   for	   other	   multinationals	   in	   the	   same	   3-­‐digit	   industry,	  country	  and	  year.	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